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I. INTRODUCTION
Since its publication in 1985, Lenore J. Weitzman's The Divorce
Revolution' has dominated public discussion about the social and
economic consequences of divorce. 2 It received mostly favorable
reviews in professional journals,3 won the 1986 Book Award of the
American Sociological Association, 4 and it inspired the California
Senate to establish a special Task Force on Family Equity to develop
specific proposals for the implementation of its recommendations to
reform that state's law of marital dissolution.' It has also been cited
authoritatively by courts, including the United States Supreme Court 6
7
and several state supreme courts.
1. L. WErrztAaN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985) [hereinafter DIVORCE
REVOLUTION].
2. For a list of general media coverage, see Jacob, Faulting No-Fault, 1986
Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 773, 773 n.1 [hereinafter Jacob].
3. A search of the legal literature has revealed over a dozen reviews of Tm
DIVORCE REVOLUTION. (It has also been extensively reviewed in social science journals). See, e.g., Schulman, The Hardships of Divorce, 8 F m. ADvoc. 35, 35 (1986)
(.'The Divorce Revolution' is probably the most important book of the last decade
for family lawyers and judges, as well as divorcing spouses."). But see McIsaac, The
Divorce Revolution: A Critique, 10 CAL. FAm. L. REP. 3069, 3069 (May 1986)
("[S]ome basic flaws and inaccuracies mar her work.").
4. The American Sociological Association honored THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION
with its 1986 Book Award for its "Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship" and
commended the book for its "artful interworking of basic theory with a wide range
of empirical evidence ... its detailed research craftsmanship ... and its illuminating
use of fundamental theory." See Weitzman, Bringing the Law Back In, 1986 Am. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 791, 792 [hereinafter Bringing The Law] (emphasis omitted).
5. See 9 FAm. ADvoc. 48 (1986); Weitzman, Bringing the Law Back In, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 791, 797; FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY EQUITY ES-I, P-i to P-3 (1987) (citing California Senate Resolution 28 of
1986).
. 6. Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3024 n.7, 3026 n.15 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
7. See In re Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1987); Bobo v. Jewell, 38 Ohio St. 3d
330, 528 N.E.2d 180 (1988); Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492 N.E.2d 131
(1986); Wall v. Wall, 517 Pa. 29, 534 A.2d 465 (1987).
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"THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION" REVISITED

The book consists largely of reformulated research' which Weitzman and others had previously issued over a period of several years. 9
"This research," she concludes, "shows that, on the average, divorced women and the minor children in their households experience
a 73 percent decline in their standard of living in the first year after
divorce. Their former husbands, in contrast, experience a 42 percent
0°
rise in their standard of living.'
Weitzman faults no-fault divorce and marital property distribution laws for this lopsided turn of events." Together, they allow a
husband to abandon his wife with no penalty other than a share of
the property 'accumulated during their marriage plus mild alimony
and child support obligations. He retains unimpaired the most productive "family" asset: his career. Since his future career income is
not distributed upon divorce, he will ultimately enjoy a higher
standard of living than his ex-wife and the children who remain in
her custody. Weitzman believes this is unfair and should be remedied
legislatively.
The Divorce Revolution takes its data from random samples of
certain California court dockets. These data are supplemented by
interviews with attorneys, judges and divorced men and women.
8. See, e.g., Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic
Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv.
1181 (1981) [hereinafter Economics of Divorce]; Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody
Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns For Child Custody, Support and
Visitation After Divorce, 12 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REv. 472 (1979) [hereinafter Child
Custody A wards].
9. Although THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION was published in 1985, the original
California data upon which its conclusions are based were drawn from the period
1968-1978 and not updated. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at xviii-xxi, 403411.
10. Id. at xii. See also id. at 337-39.
This finding has been widely disseminated by the popular media and undoubtedly
ranks among the most famous family statistics of the decade. See supra note 2.
11. This critique does not directly address Weitzman's treatment of no-fault
divorce. For analyses of this issue, see, e.g., Review Symposium on Weitzman's
"Divorce Revolution", 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 757.
See also Melli, Bargaining Under No-Fault Divorce, 9 FAmsnumm 3 (May 1989)
[hereinafter No-FaultDivorce] (non-random, exploratory study suggests that, contrary
to Weitzman's argument, power in divorce negotiation under no-fault regime has not
shifted completelly to the party who wants out of the marriage; rather, it remains
with the party who is reluctant to end the marriage and who therefore can delay the
divorce so as to force a more favorable settlement). For a full report of the underlying
study, see Melli, Erlanger and Chambliss, The Process of Negotiation:An Exploratory
Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 1133 (1987)
[hereinafter Process of Negotiation].
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There is the usual academic apparatus of charts, tables and footnotes
which are marshaled to buttress its conclusions.
A careful study of the book, however, should leave the critical
reader unconvinced.
II.
A.

WEITZMAN'S THEORY OF "CAREER ASSETS"

A HUSBAND'S FUTURE INCOME AS DISTRIBUTABLE MARITAL
PROPERTY

One of Weitzman's "major findings' '1 2 is that the average divorcing family accumulates very few tangible assets ,relative to its
gross income. The median net worth of divorcing families in 1978
was only fifty-three percent of the "typical" 1977 family's net worth
($11,000 vs. $20,752). 13 A divorcing couple earning a gross income
Of $16,000 in 1978 could be expected to have accumulated only
$4,100 in net asset value after several years of marriage. 4 Thus, for
the average divorcing wife, an equitable distribution of marital
property yields very little in the way of financial security. 5
Instead of being content to conclude from these data that
divorcing couples are relatively poor, 16 Weitzman derives a second,
''more surprising" conclusion:
12. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 53, 59.
13. Id. at 57, 445 n.9.
14. Id. at 59 (Table 4).
15. Cf. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Child Support and Alimony: 1985 (Supp.
Report), CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS (Mar. 1989), at 7 (Table E), [hereinafter
CILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY] (in the spring of 1986, 39%7 of ever-divorced women
reported receiving some form of property settlement).
16. Cf. Duncan & Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic Consequences
of MaritalDissolution, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485, 487 (1985) [hereinafter Reconsideration]:
[T]he average predivorce family income levels of couples about to divorce
are substantially lower than the family incomes of intact couples. Divorcing
couples are clearly not a random subset of all couples, at least with respect
to income. Simple comparisons of family income of divorced women with
the family incomes of intact couples will therefore overstate the average
drop in family income that divorced women experience.
See also S. Bianchi & E. McArthur, Family Distribution and Economic Hardship:
The Short-Run Picture for Children 7-13, 16 (paper presented at the 1989 annual
meeting of the Population Association of America, Baltimore, MD, Mar., 1989)
[hereinafter Bianchi & McArthur] (children who experienced the departure of their
father from the household had levels of economic well-being only 80076 of those
children who remained in stable two-parent situations, and departing fathers prior to
their departures had only 7807o the employment rate of fathers who remained with
their families; thus, economic disadvantage precedes family disruption, and a simple
comparison of the economics of divorcing families with those of stable two-parent
families would produce a relatively unrefined analysis).

"THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION" REVISITED
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If [a] couple has accumulated about $4,000 worth of property
and has a median yearly income of $16,000, it would take
them only one-quarter of a year to earn $4,000-the value of
This sugtheir total community [i.e., marital] property ....
worth
typically
is
gests that the spouses' earning capacity
much more than the tangible assets of the marriage....
It takes the average divorced man about ten months to earn
as much as the community's net worth .... This suggests that
support awards that divide income, especially future income,
are the most valuable entitlements awarded at divorce.... 11
In arriving at this conclusion, Weitzman again rejects the plain
implication of her data: that the bulk of poor divorcing couples'
gross income is consumed by expenses which leave little left over for
the accumulation of assets. Instead, she offers an alternative explanation-for which she presents no supporting evidence:
[M]ost divorcing couples have invested in something else
[other than tangible assets]-something the courts do not yet
label as property-and their real wealth lies in this other type
[T]hey have invested in their careers and
of investment ....
earning capacities. And these assets are much more valuable
than their tangible assets .... 11
She goes on to propose that the product of this assumed marital
investment in careers and earning capacities-in effect, the future
income of the husband-should be equitably distributed by the court
to the wife.
Even though Weitzman offers no supporting evidence for her
striking conclusion that the average asset-poor divorcing husband
invests in his career by exchanging current tangible assets for future
earning capacity, let us assume that this is so) 9 It follows that if his
future gross income were to be equitably distributed by the court tp
his wife, he would be unable to maintain such investment at its predivorce level without precipitating a decline in his post-divorce standard of living. At this point, he might well feel compelled to maintain
17.

DIVORCE REVOLUTION,

18. Id. at 68.

supra note 1, at 59-61 (emphasis in original).

19. The fact that most husbands have only jobs, not careers, is not considered
here. Similarly not considered is the daunting practical difficulty of accurately
determining in individual cases what share (if any) of a husband's career capacity is
actually attributable to his marriage and what share is attributable to pre-existing or
other extra-marital endowments.
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his standard of living rather than continue to invest in his career.20
Consequently, his projected gross income would decline. This, in
turn, would cause a shortfall from the projected level of gross income
2
which the court is bidden by Weitzman to distribute. '
In other words, if Weitzman's "surprising" conclusion is indeed
correct-that the asset-poor husband invests in his ability to earn a
living-then any court-imposed impairment of such investment would
likely trigger an accelerated decline in his propensity to continue to
earn a living. The post-divorce income of the family would actually
be reduced by Weitzman's proposal.
In such a situation, the most plausible option available to a
court seeking to maintain the family's projected post-divorce standard
of living would be to encourage the ex-wife to work also.
B.

WORKING WOMEN

Weitzman, however, is not encouraging to ex-wives who must
work. "Most working women," she cautions, "are clustered in a limited
number of low-status, low-paying jobs z2 .... [W]omen's wages are

low," amounting on the average to only sixty percent those of men. 23
20. Cf. Hampton, Marital Disruption: Some Social and Economic Conse-

quences. in 3 FIVE THOUSAND

AMERICAN FAMILES - PATTERNS

OF

ECONOMIC PROGRESS

178-79, 185 (G. Duncan & J. Morgan eds. 1975) [hereinafter Marital Disruption]
(divorcing husbands exhibit large declines in their propensity to plan ahead, a lowered
propensity to economize and they engage in a reduced number of money-earning
acts).
21. This decline is in addition to the immediate decline in family income usually
associated with divorce. See, e.g., DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 337.
22. But cf. Duncan, Do Women "Deserve" to Earn Less than Men? in YEARS
OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY

164 (1984) [hereinafter

YEARS OF POVERTY] (citations

omitted):
In the first place, there is only weak evidence that among equally qualified
and experienced women, those who work in a typically female occupation
earn less. Secondly, longitudinal data suggest that there is substantial
movement of women between typically female and male jobs, indicating
that many women are not locked unalterably into the female-dominated
jobs.
23. Cf. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 343: "In 1979, the median per
capita income of divorced women who had not remarried was $4,152, just over half
[530o] of the $7,886 income of divorced men who had not remarried." For a
discussion of the effect of remarriage on divorced women's standard of living, see

§ IV(B).

U.S. Census Bureau data on annual median earnings of year-round, full-time
workers for 1987, the latest available at this writing, indicate that the ratio of
women's to men's earnings was 65% and that since 1982, the increase in real earnings
of females has outpaced that of their male counterparts. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES:

1987

(ADVANCE
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Further, a minority of divorced mothers with young children at home

may be able to work only part time. 24
Here again, Weitzman does not grant the most credible implication of these data-which has been demonstrated by other researchers-that the wage differential between divorced men and women is
part of the larger, general phenomenon of society's relatively low

valuation of women's work outside the home 25 for which an individual
DATA FROM THE MARCH 1988 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY) 5 (1988); U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS,

MONEY INCOME

OF HOUSEHOLDS,

FAMILIES,

AND

PERSONS IN THE

3-5 (1989). Cf. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, NEWS 1 (April 26, 1989) (Current Population Survey data on median

UNITED STATES: 1987

weekly earnings show women's full-time median earnings to be 70 percent those of

men's and that since 1979 their median weekly earnings have risen 84 percent
compared to only 64 percent for men and 76 percent for the cost of living as measured
by the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers). The weekly data used by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics differ somewhat from the annual data used by the
Census Bureau for the measurement of female-male wage ratio; however, the trend
in both series is similar. See generally D. Herz, There is More than One Way of
Looking at the Male-Female Earnings Gap, Working Paper (April 1988). Telephone
conversations with Susan E. Shank and Dianne Herz, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
June 6, 7, 1989. See also V. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC

EQUALITY

66

(1988) [hereinafter WOMEN'S QUEST] (the narrowing of the wage gap during this
decade has been most pronounced among women born between 1946-1950 who had

substantially fewer children and were more likely to divorce than women who were
born only half a decade earlier); Smith & Ward, Women in the Labor Market and
in the Family, 3 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 9, 9-18 (1989) [hereinafter Labor Market]

(between 1920 and 1980 women's wages grew 20 percent faster than men's but this
progress has been obscured by the entry of increasing numbers of initially unskilled
women into labor force - 20 percent of women worked in 1920 compared to over
60 percent today - and as this process reaches its peak and the skills level of women
comes to approximate that of men, the female-male wage ratio will rise to over 80
percent by the year 2000).
24. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 206, 342, 462 n.16.
25. See generally YEARS oF POVERTY, supra note 22, at 153-71 (women do not
"deserve" to earn less than men because their personal trade-off between family
responsibilities-including childrearing-and labor force participation accounts at
most for only about one-third of the male-female earnings gap; the other two-thirds
appear to be due to some combination of socialization and discrimination). See also
Hill, The Wage Effects of Marital Status and Children, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 579,
590-92 (1979) [hereinafter Wage Effects] (marriage, apart from childrearing, produces
no negative wage effects for women).
Cf. generally, WOMEN'S QUEST, supra note 23 (women earn less than men
primarily due to expected childcare responsibilities); Schwartz, Management Women
and The New Facts of Life, 67 HARv. Bus. REV. 65 (Jan./Feb. 1989) (internal
corporate studies [no citations given apparently because of corporate fear of charges
of "sexism"] show the cost of employing women in management is greater than the
cost of employing men due to the need to accommodate womens' childcare responsibilities). Neither Fuchs nor Schwartz distinguishes the findings of Duncan and Hill.
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divorcing husband cannot be held responsible. Rather, Weitzman
Notwithstanding the male-female wage gap, the recent increased labor participation rate of women has been identified as the chief cause of the increased divorce
rate among whites because it has made divorce economically more viable than in the
past. See W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 76-77, 83-84 (1987). See also
Labor Market, supra note 23, at 21-22 (women's improving labor market situation
has paradoxically reduced the gains from marriage: rising female wages encourage
work and inhibit fertility, and marriages where women earn more are likely to
dissolve). Cf. Spitze, Women's Employment and Family Relations: A Review, 50 J.
OF MARRIAGE & THE FAm. 595, 597 (1988) (given the highly negative economic
consequences of divorce for women as portrayed by Weitzman, we should not lose
sight of the value of employment for those women who ultimately do divorce). These
findings are consistent with the fact that even in California, whose no-fault divorce
law permits men to initiate divorce with relative ease and which Weitzman argues
does not adequately protect the economic interests of divorcing women, some twothirds of divorce actions are nevertheless initiated by women, that is, women file for
divorce at twice the rate of men. See Dixon & Weitzman, Evaluating the Impact of
No-Fault Divorce in California, 29 FAM. REL. 297, 300 (July 1980). See also London,
Children of Divorce, in NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS: VITAL AND HEALTH
STATISTICS 10 (1989) [hereinafter Children of Divorce] (among couples with children,
wives were petitioners for divorce in 66% of cases). Citing Weitzman's report that
women's overriding concern in divorce cases is the custody of their children, London
speculates that mothers might choose to be petitioners because they feel this will give
them a better chance of being awarded custody. However, she supplies no evidence
that petitioners' counsel have a custody advantage over respondents' counsel, and
she concedes that "other explanations are possible" to explain why mothers file more
than fathers. Id.
Duncan, in YEARS OF POVERTY, supra note 22 at 153, notes that in Biblical
times, as in our own, a woman was "evaluated" at 60% the valuation of a man.
Lev. 27:1-4; cf. the historical information in WOMEN'S QUEST, supra note 23 at 49.
He interprets the Biblical valuation to be a measure of the relative worth of mens'
and womens' labor. Cf. J. HERTZ, THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFroRAHs 547 (2d ed.
1968) (valuation appears based on market value of individual's labor, and women,
not possessing the physical strength of men, had a lower valuation than men). This
is an unlikely interpretation. At Ex. 21:32, the Bible assigns an equivalent valuation
to male and female servants, the same valuation which it assigns to free females at
Lev. 27:1-4. A more plausible explanation for the higher valuation given to free
males by Lev. 27:1-4 is that these valuations are but nominal quantifications-for
the purposes of a gift offering to the sanctuary-of the sacral responsibilities of the
various parties. Male and female servants, as well as free females, have fewer sacral
obligations than free males because the former have domestic responsibilities which
take priority; hence their nominal sacral valuations are lower. These valuations do
not measure relative labor value and certainly not relative worth as human beings.
See 2 D. HOFFMANN, THE BoOK OF LEVITICUS 271 (Heb.; trans. of DAs BUCH
LEVITICUS) (1953-54). Cf. 3 M. ROSENBAUM & A. SILBERMANN, PENTATEUCH AND
RAsm's COMMENTARY 130 (1972-73) (valuation cannot refer to market value because
it is fixed across classifications and does not vary with the relative labor value of
individuals within each classification).
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claims-again without supporting evidence-that "it is marriage...
itself that typically creates the different structural opportunities that
men and women face at divorce," '2 6 that divorcing women face a wage
differential essentially because their earning abilities have been "impaired" by marriage and because marriage, even for continually
employed women, "had a detrimental effect on their careers." ' 27
Therefore, Weitzman argues, divorcing women should be compensated
for these disabilities by their ex-husbands: the standards of living of
both parties should be permanently equalized after divorce. In addition, for younger women, Weitzman recommends special alimony
awards that would "allow them to take advantage of the benefits of
counseling, education, and retraining, and enable them to fully invest
in their careers." ' 2 Finally, such awards "should provide for cost-ofliving increases ....
[Plenalties and interest should be assessed on
late payments. "29
Insensibly, Weitzman's argument coils into a conundrum: distribute the husband's future income, thus reduce his ability to invest in
his career, thus reduce his propensity to earn future income, thus
reduce the amount of future income available for distribution to the
wife, thus oblige the wife to work to maintain the family's standard
of living; then require the husband to compensate the wife for her
marital disadvantage in the workplace, thus reduce still more the
husband's ability to invest in his career, thus reduce still more the
husband's propensity to earn future income, thus reduce still more
the amount of his future income available for distribution to the wife,
thus oblige the wife to work still more....
The inconsistency of Weitzman's argument is highlighted by the
paradox that, under her recipe for reform, a divorced woman will not
be maintained merely at the lower economic level she would have
attained had she not been "disadvantaged" by her marriage30 but

26. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at xi.
27. Id. at xi, 391. But cf. id. at 206, 342. Weitzman appears inconsistently to
imply that the marital "disadvantage" is both the major cause of the "normal" 40
percentage point male-female income gap and is also in addition to it. Both views
are incorrect. Statistically, the marital "disadvantage" is a (minor) component of the
"normal" gap. Cf. id. at 36 (marriage can be partly responsible for the different
prospects men and women face after divorce).
28. Id. at 391. But cf. YEARS OF POVERTY, supra note 22, at 168: "Policies
that promote the educational attainment and training of women ...

most of the wage gap between men and women."
29. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 391.

will not eliminate

30. Cf. Duncan & Morgan, Young Children and "Other" Family Members, in
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rather at the higher level she actually enjoyed as a "disadvantaged"
wife."
III.
A.

WEITZMAN'S STANDARD OF LIVING INDEX

WEITZMAN'S EXTREME RESULTS

Because society generally rewards women's work outside the
home less well than men's work outside the home, it may be expected
that women will fare less well than men after divorce. It should not
even be surprising to find that in the first few years after divorce,
due to the costs and stresses generated by the breakup of the marital
home, ex-husbands as well as ex-wives fare less well.than their married
counterparts. Weitzman's result-that in the first year after divorce
women experience a seventy-three percent decline in their standard of
living, whereas men experience a forty-two percent rise in their
2
standard of living-confounds these expectations by a wide margin.1
And indeed, an analysis of its derivation will cast considerable
doubt on its dependability.
4 FIVE THOUSAND AMERIcAN FAMILIEs-PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 159, 167
(G. Duncan & J. Morgan eds. 1976) [hereinafter Young Children] (young women
who start their own households without marrying fare much worse economically than
other women).
31. See Duncan, Unmarried Heads of Households and Marriage, in 4 FIVE
THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMILIES-PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 86-88 (G. Duncan
& J. Morgan eds. 1976) [hereinafter Heads of Households] (marriage results in an
increase in the standard of living for women but in a decrease for men).
32. Weitzman terms her results "not surprising." DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra
note 1, at 36. However, several studies which attempted to quantify changes in the
standards of living of divorcing spouses preceded THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION. For
references, see Duncan & Hoffman, Economic Consequences of Marital Instability,
in HORIZONTAL EQUITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 467 (M. David
& T. Smeeding eds. 1985) [hereinafter Economic Consequences]; Weiss, The Impact
of Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption in Single-ParentHouseholds, 46
J. OF MARRIAGE & THE FAM. 115, 127 (1984) [hereinafter Impact]; Espanshade, The
Economic Consequences of Divorce, 41 J. OF MARRIAGE & THE FAM. 615, 623 (1979)
[hereinafter Consequences]. Their results are considerably less extreme than Weitzman's. For the findings of Hoffman & Holmes and Duncan & Hoffman See § IV.
Weitzman does not explain the large variance between her findings and those of her
predecessors, some of whom she unaccountably cites in support of her numbers.
DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 343.

Cf. id at 337 (Hoffman & Holmes' poineering results, which are modest compared
to Weitzman's, are nevertheless characterized by her as "surprising.").
For the thesis of Hoffman & Duncan that Weitzman's extreme findings are the
result of mathematical error, see § IV(C).
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WEITZMAN'S BIASED SAMPLE

As noted, some of the information in The Divorce Revolution
comes from random samplings of court dockets. The advantage of
using a random sample in statistical analysis is that one can compute
the relative reliability of results derived from the sample and eliminate
conclusions that might derive from biases within the sample. However,
the pool of information from which Weitzman derives her standard
of living figures is not a random sample.
Weitzman's standard of living figures are based on personal
interviews conducted in 1978 with 114 men and 114 women from the
greater Los Angeles area who had been recently divorced (though
apparently not necessarily from each other). From an initial random
sampling of Los Angeles County divorce decrees granted between
May and July 1977, an oversampling of long-married and highproperty couples was selected. 3 Prospects were then sent a letter
asking them if they were willing to participate in the research.
Supplementary searches were conducted to contact those who did not
respond to the letter. Half of the targets were located and eightythree percent of these agreed to be interviewed. Though this response
rate was considered favorable, 58.5% of the original random sample
34
was lost and, consequently, so was the randomness of the sample.
The final sample was essentially self-selected.
Self-selected interviewees often have ulterior motives for agreeing
to be interviewed. "We knew something was different," Weitzman
acknowledges, "when people began calling in response to our initial
letter and telling us why they wanted to participate."" Weitzman's
interviewing supervisor subsequently reported to Weitzman the enthusiasm of these interviewees in glowing terms:
[T]hey thought.., that people can really change the laws and
can really do something for them .... Also [your] letter said
33. Weitzman notes that the upper income wives in her sample suffered the
greatest economic deprivation upon divorce. DIVORcE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at
325, 329-30. Their over-representation, therefore, would skew her overall findings.
Weitzman claims to have corrected for this bias statistically as well as in terms of
the presentation of data throughout THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION. Id. at xxi, 408. It is
virtually impossible for the reader to verify these assertions. For the inability of
Hoffman & Duncan to replicate Weitzman's findings, see § IV(C).
34. Id. at 407-11. See Hoffman & Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641, 644 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter Hoffman &
Duncan) (Weitzman's sample may not be representative of the U.S. divorced population or even of the Los Angeles County divorced population).

35.

DrVORcE REVOLUTION,

supra note 1, at 410 (emphasis in original).
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this study is actually going to accomplish something . . . you
know you didn't just say we are interested in finding out your
opinions, attitudes, such and such but you said that other
states are looking to what is happening in California ....
and we care about your experiences and what you think about
the law ....
I think they really felt that their responses were
good.3 6
some
do
going to
The interviewers also looked upon it as an important thing. It
was the way we briefed them, I think we instilled that in
They were really close [with the interviewees] after
them ....
the interview. It established a special bond. The interviewers
felt responsible for the [interviewees]....
They were doing
this big important work together....
Many of the interviewers had trouble leaving the interview.
Respondents would follow them out to their cars, or invite
them to stay to dinner. You know (one male interviewer)
found it so hard to have to keep turning down invitations to
play tennis and bridge; he felt he was letting down a new
friend. 3
Thus, many interviewees shared (or were infected with) the
reforming spirit of Weitzman and her colleagues. They were told of
Weitzman's dissatisfaction with and desire to change the divorce
process. They were led to believe that their interviews could lead to a
modification of American family law. They certainly could evaluate
which kinds of responses would further their cause. Weitzman acknowledged that their enthusiasm "undoubtedly contributed to the
unusually high response rate." 3 It is fair to suspect that not all of
their enthusiastic responses were unbiased.
C.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF WEITZMAN'S STANDARD OF LIVING
INDEX

The data Weitzman collected from her interviewees included
information "about income, occupation, and employment as well as
36. Id. (emphasis added). This testimony diminishes the credibility of Weitzman's protestations at both the beginning and end of the book: "When I initiated
this research I assumed ...

that ...

no-fault divorce could only have positive

results." Id. at xi. "If I, as a researcher, had a personal or political goal beyond my
stated aim of 'analyzing the effects of the new law on the social and legal process of
divorce,' it was to discover what made this law successful so that potential reformers
in other states could learn from the California experience." Id. at 358.
37. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 410-11 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 411.
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property ownership and value. . . . "9 She does not report detailed
expense ("needs") information. In any case, in computing the standards of living-the income/needs ratios-of the men and women in
her sample, she does not use their personal needs data. She does not
use real expense data at all.
Unfortunately, Weitzman gives only fragmentary and incomplete
information concerning the construction of her standard of living
indexA° Generally, she seems to have proceeded as follows: She
assumed that her interviewees had needs identical to the Lower
Standard Budget of the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Since the Lower Standard Budget was computed only for a
four-person urban family, it had to be adjusted mathematically so
that it could also apply to her interviewee families both before and
after divorce. This was accomplished by using the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' Revised Equivalence Scale for Estimating Equivalent Incomes or Budget Costs by Family Types.
Three different needs budgets were simulated for each interviewee's family: one for the pre-divorce family, one for the man's postdivorce family and/or one for the woman's post-divorce family. An
income/needs ratio was then calculated for each family. Membership
in post-divorce families included new spouses and cohabitants as well
as their custodial children.
Weitzman then compared the income/needs ratio of the predivorce family .with the income/needs ratio of the man's and/or
woman's post-divorce family one year after divorce. Her results were
as noted above: "Men experience a 42 percent improvement in their
postdivorce standard of living, while women experience a 73 percent
41
decline."
There are many problems with Weitzman's methodology.
D.

THE PROBLEM OF SAMPLE SIZE

To begin, Weitzman does not explicitly tell us her sample size
for this calculation. Although she reports having interviewed a total
228 people, she frequently uses only subsamples of this group for
statistical conclusions throughout The Divorce Revolution.4 2 In such
39. Id. at 410.
40. See id. at 337-39.
41. Id. at 339 (emphasis omitted). Weitzman does not indicate whether the
post-divorce budgets were adjusted for inflation. If they were not, then her calculations would overstate the increase in the men's income/needs ratio and understate
the decline in the women's ratio. Id. at 337-39.
42. E.g., DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 326, 328, 333.
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cases, she usually does not reveal in the text that she has based her
conclusions on small subsamples; the concerned reader must check
accompanying statistical tables to determine her sample size. For her
income/needs calculation, however, she supplies no statistical tables
at all, only a simplified chart which graphs her conclusion.
Small subsamples tend to produce less reliable results than the
larger samples from which they are drawn.4 3 The reader of The
Divorce Revolution is simply unable to judge the statistical reliability
of Weitzman's sample because Weitzman has not provided the necessary information."
E.

THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING INCOME

On the income side, Weitzman does not tell us whether she
subtracted alimony and child support payments from the husband's
gross income before computing his income/needs ratio. Weitzman
does make this kind of adjustment elsewhere in The Divorce Revolution and dutifully notes it. 4 Here, however, she is silent.
The same concern may be directed at Weitzman's inclusion of
new spouses and cohabitants in'the post-divorce family. Although she
is not clear on this point, it would appear that she includes their
income along with that of the ex-husband or ex-wife. Since she also
found that ex-husbands were some five times more likely than exwives to remarry or cohabit within one year of their divorce and that
most of these new spouses or cohabitants were employed,46 inclusion
of a new spouse's or cohabitant's income would tend to weight an
increase in post-divorce standard of living in favor of the ex-husband
if, as is likely, many of these new spouses or cohabitants were
themselves childless.4 7 Once again, although Weitzman adjusts for this

43. See Jacob, supra note 2, at 774-75.
44. Weitzman is also silent about actual sample size and statistical significance
in her original law review publication of this data. See Economics of Divorce, supra
note 8, at 1249-53. But cf. Bringing the Law, supra note 4, at 792: "1 had already
published tests of significance and discussed them in detail in a series of five journal
articles [no citations] ....
[Tihe book . . . discussed almost nothing but significant
relationships."
45. DVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 326, 328, 333.
46. Id. at 327-28, 333.
47. The economics of scale produced by merging in one household the income
of a relatively low-wage ex-husband with the income of his childless cohabitant can
be expected to result in an enhanced standard of living for the parties.
For a discussion of the effects of remarriage on the economic condition of
divorced women, see § IV(B).
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variable elsewhere, 48 she does not indicate what she does with it here.
Weitzman also implicitly assumes that husbands and wives share
the husband's income equally during marriage. For many families this
may not be the case. 49 If during marriage the husband had exercised
de facto control over family income, then divorce will raise his
income/needs ratio less-and correspondingly lower the wife's income/needs ratio less-than it would had his income been shared
equally with his wife during marriage 0
Moreover, upon divorce, there is often a property settlement,
sometimes in the form of a lump-sum cash distribution. In addition
to the value of the family home and other tangible assets, a property
settlement may dispose of insurance, rights to future pension payments
and the value of professional and business education, goodwill and/
or licenses." These assets and rights serve the non-titled spouse,
52
usually the wife, as a supplement to-or a surrogate for-alimony.
Indeed, in a large number of cases, they comprise the most significant
economic flows distributed by the court. 3 But because they are
technically property settlements and not income items, their value is
not reflected in income/needs ratios. Their omission artificially raises
the relative value of the husband's post-divorce ratio and correspondingly reduces the relative value of the wife's.
A related issue is the question of debt. Standard of living
accounting commonly considers debt to be an adjustment to property,
not to current income or needs. Income/needs ratios, therefore,
48. DrVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 327-28, 333.

49. See Reconsideration, supra note 16, at 496 n.8.
50. This consideration might depend in part upon the legal environment of the
couple's residence. It is another reason for being cautious in extrapolating Weitzman's
conclusions, based on a limited California sample, nationwide.

It also applies to Weitzman's analysis of family per capita income. DrvoRcE
supra note 1, at 327-29, 332-36. Weitzman implicitly allocates the same

REVoLuTIoN,

fraction of family income to a breadwinner and a baby, an obvious absurdity. See
E. LAZEAR & R. MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME wrrfN TE HOUSEHOLD 1, 12-25,
54-65, 87-98, 135-49 (1988) [hereinafter ALLOCATION OF INCOME] (the presumption

that incomes are uniformly distributed within families seems born of ignorance and
is supported by neither theory nor fact: "average" families appear to spend only
38%1o as much on a child as on an adult; moreover, knowledge of family income does
not necessarily imply knowledge of intrafamily welfare because the latter is also a
function of each family member's particular utility function).

51. See generally L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIUTION OF PROPERTY (1983 &
Supp. 1988) (paying particular attention to Chapter 6) [hereinafter EQUITABLE DisTRIBUTION].

52. Id. at § 1.01.
53. Id. at § 6.09.
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usually do not account for debt. However, for the many divorcing
families who have little wealth or liquidity, debt service must come
off the top of current income.5 4 This is especially true during and
immediately after the divorcing period when excess family debt is
distributed by the court, usually to the party with the higher income. 5
In addition, attorneys' fees, which could account for a significant
percentage of a divorcing family's estate 5 6 must be paid at this time.
In many states, the party with the higher income can be ordered by
the court to pay part or all of the other party's attorney's fees.57 Since
the party with the higher income is usually the husband, a failure to
adjust for debt produces an exaggerated standard of living profile for
ex-husbands and, conversely, an understated profile for ex-wives.
F.

THE PROBLEM OF A TWO-POINT TIME SERIES

A fundamental problem with Weitzman's income figures lies in
her choice of only two points in time for purposes of comparison.
Since divorce is a long-term event, it is necessary to measure its effects
over many years in order to track its trend and determine its permanent consequences. Long-term trends are normally interrupted by
temporary ups and downs. By looking at the relationship of only two
points of a long-term time series, an observor cannot tell whether
they conform to the trend or not.5"
This is especially true of the two points Weitzman selected. A
divorcing husband is commonly advised to minimize his current
income so as to limit his liability for court-imposed alimony and child
support. This would comprise deferring raises and bonuses and accruing expenses. In the year after his divorce, he will begin to recognize
these deferred raises and bonuses along with any raises and bonuses
normally paid during such year. In addition, he may take on extra
work to cover his alimony and child support obligations.5 9 All this
54. Nine percent of Weitzman's sample had negative net worths because their
debts exceeded their assets. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 56-57.
55. See id. at 102; EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 51, at § 6.31.
56. See DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 73 first note, 448 n.15. Cf.
Tuohy & Warden, The Fall From Grace of a Greylord Judge, 75 A.B.A. J. 60 (Feb.
1989) (divorce court's calendar system and its jurisdiction over attorney's fees
produced greatly inflated attorney's fees).
57. See, e.g., Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, § 313, 9A U.L.A. 450 (1973);
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 201:0005.
58. See Jacob, supra note 2 at 775-76.
59. See, e.g., R. HAsKINs, A. DOBELSTEIN, J. AKIN & J. SCHWARTZ, ESTIMATES
OF NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTIONS POTENTIAL AND THE INCOME SECURITY OF
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gives any comparison between the year of divorce and the first year
after divorce a terrific jolt. Perhaps Weitzman saw poetic justice in
using this phenomenon to make her case. 6° Fair methodology, however, would recommend that the year of divorce and the year after
divorce be regarded as atypical.
The obverse may be said about a divorcing housewife. The period
surrounding divorce is one of great adjustment for her. She may enter
or re-enter the full-time work force at beginner's pay. 61 She may
resume her education or enter a training program. Her earning
62
experience during this period should not be assumed as typical.
G.

THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING NEEDS

It is important to emphasize that the needs which Weitzman
assigns to her interviewees are not their real expenses. In fact, the
Lower Standard Budget which she used as a measure of their needs
does not pretend to reflect the expense experience of any particular
family. Rather, it was designed to answer the question: given a level
of income sufficient to cover expenses, how might a 63self-supporting
lower income family of four adequately budget itself?
The [Lower Standard Budget does] not describe how families
actually spend their money, but rather answer[s] questions on
38, 54 (1985) (University of North Carolina, Bush Institute
for Child and Family Policy) [hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTIONS] (in sample
of predominately low income black absent fathers who paid an average of nearly
20% of their income in child support, about 20% had two jobs and nearly 10% had
three or more jobs).
FEMALE-HEADED FAMILIs

60.
61.
entering
rapidly).
62.

DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 324-25, 342-43.
See YEARS OF POVERTY, supra note 22, at 162 (hourly wages of women reworkforce are initially lower than when they left, but this gap narrows

See Sawhill, Comment to Economic Consequences of Marital Stability, in

HORIZONTAL EQUITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 469 (M. David &

T. Smeeding eds. 1985) (it is important to find out what happens to divorced women
beyond the first five years). But cf. Hoffman, Divorce and Economic Well-being:
The Effects on Men, Women and Children, DEL. L. 18, 20 (Spring, 1987) [hereinafter
Divorce and Economic Well-being]: "The major adjustments in labor market activity

... occur almost immediately. Changes thereafter are minor and sometimes offsetting
- a woman's earned income does continue to increase, but child support payments
fall as non-compliance rises." Impact, supra note 32, at 126 (in all income groups,
divorced women's reduction in income appears to persist for as long they remain

single).

63. See U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THREE STANDARDS
oF LIVING FOR AN URBAN FAMILY OF FOUR PERSONS, vi-vii, 1-4, 5, 39-40 (Spring 1967)
(Bulletin 1570-5) [hereinafter THREE STANDARDS OF LIVING].
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how much it costs, at current price levels, to purchase the
specified lists of goods and services. . ..
These distributions of the budget costs for family consumption
do not reflect the way in which average families of the budgettype actually spend their money, or the way in which families
65
should spend their money.
Indeed, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has cautioned that "average"
families probably allocate their expenses "in a manner substantially
different" from Lower Standard Budget families."
Weitzman arbitrarily assumed that her interviewees faced the
Lower Standard Budget (after adjusting for family composition) both
before and after their divorces. Her purpose was to portray changes
in their income relative to their needs as a measure of change in their
standards of living. To do this, she had to hold her interviewees'
needs (adjusted for family composition) constant before and after
divorce. Had she reflected true changes in expenses after divorce, she
could not readily have compared income/needs before and after
divorce as a measure of change in their standard of living.
In reality, however, it is likely that these divorced intervieweesmen and women-had qualitatively different budgets after their divorces than they had before: In many cases, for example, the men
will have left single family homes for small apartments. They will
have exchanged home-cooked meals for fast-food fare. Correspondingly, the women will have cut down on non-essential spending and
increased their expenditures on work-related needs and child care.
Both parties will have lost the economies of scale that the intact
family provides.
Men in particular experience losses in areas that are not easily
quantifiable and are not included in income/needs ratios: for example,
loss of parenting role 67 and loss of domestic service." Their standard
of family living declines precipitously. 69
64. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THREE BUDGETS FOR
URBAN FAMILY OF FOUR PERSONS, 1969-70 (Supplement to Bulletin 1570-5) 1
(1972) [hereinafter BUDGETS].
65. THREE STANDARDS OF LivING, supra note 63, at 8.
66. Id. at 8-9.
67. Ironically (and insensitively), loss of custody is considered in income/needs
accounting solely as a reduction in needs which produces an increase in a noncustodial father's standard of living (before payment of child support). Cf. ALLOCATION OF INCOME, supra note 50 at 20, 65-66, 157. (many nonpecuniary resources that
affect true distributions of resources and well-being are allocated within a family but
are not reflected in typical economic data, and the fact that a non-custodial parent
AN
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THE PROBLEM OF ADJUSTING A STANDARDIZED BUDGET

This brings us, therefore, to the manner in which Weitzman
adjusted the Lower Standard Budget-which the Bureau of Labor
calculated only for the intact family of four-so that she could apply
it to the variously sized familes, pre- and post-divorce, in her sample.
As noted, Weitzman used the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Revised
Equivalence Scale70 to estimate the needs of her interviewees. The
Revised Equivalence Scale is a table of percentages which is designed
to answer the following kind of question: what percentage of a fourperson family budget would a person have to expend if he had only
himself-or himself and his children-to support?
The answer provided by the Revised Equivalence Scale is based
on a single simplifying assumption: equivalence means the percentage
of the four-person family food budget which the non-four-person
no longer enjoys whatever satisfaction the children once provided may well imply a
significant reduction in his standard of living); WOMEN'S QUEST, supra note 23, at
76 ("The sources of well-being are so numerous-love, work, health, family, friendships, religion-and their interactions so complex as to defy measurement and
aggregation").
68. "It is indicative that what [divorced] women say they miss most about
marriage is the husband's income ... while [divorced] men report that they most
miss having a sexual partner ... and having a partner in life." DIVORCE REVOLUTION,
supra note 1, at 348.
Weitzman goes on to report that, in spite of their adverse economic condition,
divorced women feel that their lives are in fact better than they were during marriage.
Id. at 345-349; See also Melli, Constructing a Social Problem: The Post-Divorce
Plight of Women and Children, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 759, 767 [hereinafter
Social Problem].
69. Howard, a 46-year-old businessman, said "you can't imagine how awful
it was to go from my house with my family into a studio apartment. I was
lonely. It was devastating. I felt so cheated. I was totally removed from the
everyday things: tucking the kids into bed, tripping over the toys. I treasured
the minimal time which I could have with the kids. Initially I couldn't deal
with dating but then the loneliness became unbearable. I still haven't
adjusted to the fact that I am not called when the kids get a gold star on a
paper, or when there is a crisis. I feel like I lost half of my heart and threequarters of my world."
Frankel, Single Again: Dating after Divorce, JUF News, Feb. 1989, at 46.
70. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REVISED EQUIVALENCE
SCALE FOR ESTIMATING EQUIVALENT INCOMES OR BUDGET COSTS BY FAMILY TYPE,
Bulletin No. 1570-2 (1968) [hereinafter REVISED EQUIVALENCE SCALE].
Since the Revised Equivalence Scale is designed for use only with after-tax
income figures whereas Weitzman seems to have used gross income figures for her
calculations, she probably used - or should have used - the Adjusted Revised Scale
described on pages 11-14 of the Bulletin.
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family spends on food. 71 If the "average" single male breadwinner is
estimated to spend on food only thirty-seven percent as much as the
"average" four-person family spends on food, then it is assumed
that
his total needs are also only thirty-seven percent of the four-person
72
family's needs.
The Bureau of Labor Standards acknowledges that the Revised
Equivalence Scale is an imprecise statistical tool. It ignores the existence of certain economies of scale, such as shared housing. 73 "[W]ith
given levels of income per person, a larger household may be able to
attain a higher standard of living than a smaller household. ' 74 Moreover,
[the Revised Equivalence Scale] shares limitations of equivalence scales derived by other methods: The assumptions on
which they are based are arbitrary and do not take into account
all of the factors affecting levels of consumption for families
71
differing in size and stage in the life cycle ....
In general these assumptions are reasonable for most
families, but for some family types the percentage of income
spent for food may not be an adequate measure of equivalent
well-being.... [T]he scales should be used as guidelines and
not interpreted in too literal or precise a manner. 76
In fact, the Revised Equivalence Scale assumes that significant
numbers of its "single consumer[s] . . . rather than living in boarding
houses or in a rented room and eating in restaurants ... were living
in apartments and preparing many of their meals. . . . ,,7 In other
words, the single consumers which the Revised Equivalence Scale has
in mind are largely settled housekeepers. Recently divorced men hardly
fit this profile. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the food
expenditures of Weitzman's male interviewees consisted of a higher
proportion of restaurant meals than anticipated by the Scale.78 By
applying the Scale to them, Weitzman understates their expenses and
71.
72.
73.
74.

REVISED EQUIVALENCE SCALE, supra note 70, at 1, 5 n.15, 9.

See id. at 14 (Table A-I).
Id. at 1, 7.
Id. at 1 (quoting S. PRAIs & A. HOUTHAKKER, THE ANALYSIS OF FAMILY
BUDGETS 145-146 (1955)).
75. REVISED EQUIVALENCE SCALE, supra note 70, at 1.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id. at 7.
78. This argument may be extended to other domestic needs of Weitzman's
male interviewees.
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correspondingly comes out with an inflated income/needs ratio for
them. 79
Conversely, the Revised Equivalence Scale does not appear tO
account for the well-documented ability of divorced wives to economize, especially on food. 0 A rigid application of the Scale to divorced
wives, therefore, will result in an overstatement of their real expenses.
In addition, the Lower Standard Budget assumes that all its
families are renters. It does not, therefore, account for the qualitative
difference in value which the spouse who continues to live in the
family home acquires for his or her shelter expenditure over that
which the renter spouse acquires. In addition, the Lower Standard
Budget does not treat mortgage principal payments as the investments
which they are; rather, it considers them equivalent to rental payments. " The Revised Equivalence Scale does not adjust for these
factors, and Weitzman does not otherwise account for them. As a
result, Weitzman understates the income/needs ratio of the spouseusually the wife-who continues to live in the family home. 2
Moreover, the Revised Equivalence Scale does not consistently
adjust for the fact that children represent less of an expense to a
family than does an adult. 3 Indeed, the Scale often perversely assigns
higher expenditures to a single-parent family than to a two-parent
family of equivalent size.14 Weitzman's utilization of this quirk in the

79. The Revised Equivalence Scale may be generally less reliable for one-person
than for multiple-member families. See REVISED EQUIVALENCE SCALE, supra note 70,
at 3.
80. See Impact, supra note 32, at 125 (average reduction in the cost of food to
divorced women in every income category was sizeable); Marital Disruption, supra
note 20, at 183-85 (former wives are better economizers than their ex-husbands).
81. THREE STANDARDS OF LIVING, supra note 63, at 10; REVISED EQUIVALENCE
SCALE, supra note 70, at 7.
82. See Marital Disruption, supra note 20, at 172-76 (more ex-wives than exhusbands are homeowners; more ex-husbands than ex-wives are renters).
83. See ALLOCATION OF INCOME, supra note 50, at 86-87 (average family
expenditure on a child member is only about 380o its expenditure on an adult
member).
84. REVISED EQUIVALENCE SCALE, supra note 70, at 4 (Table 1), 14 (Table
A-i).
The equivalence scale appears to have some peculiar features. For example,
the needs standard for a husband and wife less than 35 years old with no
children is 22 percent higher than for a single parent with a child, but the
standard for a married couple with [fewer] than four children is approximately 15 percent lower than for a family of the same size with only a single
parent. These nonlinear patterns account for some of the unusual findings
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Scale would result in an exaggerated needs number and therefore in
an unrealistically low incomes/needs ratio for the custodial mothers
in her sample."5
Finally, Weitzman assumes that the children of divorce live 10006
of the time with the custodial mother. Therefore, she assigns all of
the childrens' post-divorce needs to the mother. She takes no account
of the visitation time during which the children live with the noncustodial father. Standard visitation could range from overnights every
other weekend plus extended periods during school vacation to more
extensive arrangements verging on joint custody, that is, from fourteen
percent to over fifty percent of the total time a child spends with both
parents.16 Visitation time results in child-related expenses (both fixed
and variable) to the non-custodial father-over and above child
support-and correspondingly relieves the custodial mother of at least
some of them." By failing to adjust for visitation time, Weitzman

presented in the tables.
Hoffman & Duncan, supra note 34, at 644 n.5. These "peculiar features" are not
brought out in the comparison of equivalence scales in ALLOCATION OF INCOME, supra
note 50, at 195.
85. A family consisting of 2 adults and 2 children is theoretically equivalent in
terms of expenditures to a family of 2.76 adults (1 + I + .38 + .38), whereas a family
consisting of 1 adult and 3 children is theoretically equivalent to a family of only
2.14 adults (1 + .38 + .38 + .38). After divorce, a 2-adult - 2-child family consists of
one I-adult family and one 1.76-adult single parent family (1 + .38+.38), assuming
the children live 10006 of the time with the second family and assuming no
adjustments for economies of scale.
This result would have to be adjusted somewhat to account for the extra child
care expenditures of the single parent family, (id. at 86 (Table 5.4), 88-90, 158, 160)
but this adjustment still would not yield a 1-adult - 3-child family costing more than
a 2-adult - 2-child family. Telephone conversation with Prof. Edward P. Lazear
(Mar. 28, 1989).
86. Cf. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 258:
In most of the families in our sample, the children lived with the
mother. Thirty percent of the fathers saw the children at least once a week,
another 33 percent saw them once or twice a month, and the remaining 14
percent of the fathers who exercised visitation rights saw them less than
once a month. The other 23 percent of them did not see their children after
the divorce.
These percentages are sample averages of the combined responses of
men and women. The two sexes, however, report different rates of visitation.
When asked how often the noncustodial parent actually sees the children,
the median response by men is that they see their children weekly; the
women's median response is that the fathers see the children less than once
a month.
87. See, e.g., Pearson & Thoennes, Supporting Children After Divorce: The
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overstates both the increase in the husband's income/needs ratio and
the decrease in the wife's upon divorce.
For these reasons, Weitzman's measure of standard of living
changes, based entirely on a problematical budget estimate and the
inadequately adjusted income of a biased sample, overstates the
relative economic deprivation which divorced women face. Indeed,
"when economic well-being is measured either as stocks of durables
or as assets, divorced wives fare marginally better than their former
husbands.' '88

IV.
A.

THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF WEITZMAN'S RESULTS

THE EARLY WORK OF HOFFMAN AND HOLMES

Weitzman attempted to base her procedure on the earlier work
of economists Saul D. Hoffman and John Holmes. 9 Using national
data, these researchers compared the finances of intact families with
those of divorced men and women over a seven year period. Weitzman
restates their findings as follows:
Influence of Custody on Support Levels and Payment, 22 FAM. L.Q. 319, 333, 337
(1988) [hereinafter Supporting Children] (in addition to child support, non-custodial
parents make a variety of substantial, direct expenditures toward the upbringing of
their children); CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTIONS, supra note 59, at 60-61 (approximately
750 of fathers studied gave additional non-court-ordered support of various types),
88. Economic Consequences, supra note 32, at 619-20.
For a piquant expression of the popular impression of how a divorce court
divides family assets, see Van Buren, If Divorce Is In The Cards, Just Send One,
Chicago Tribune Magazine, April 1, 1989, at 36. Among the "divorce announcements" sampled was the following:
Dr. and Mrs. Theodore Weisenheimer request the honor of your presence
at the fleecing by their daughter Sara Ann of Harold A. Galinsky, the slob
she married back in 1965. Divorce to be solemnized on Friday, the seventeenth of August nineteen hundred and seventy-three at two o'clock in the
afternoon, Division Y of the Civil District Court. Celebration following at
our home.
It is certainly a coincidence that this avowedly authentic annoucement (expect
for the names) was published by Dear Abby on April Fools' Day.
89. Hoffman & Holmes, Husbands, Wives and Divorce in 4 FIVE THOUSAND
AMERICAN FAMILIES-PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 23 (G. Duncan & J.Morgan
eds. 1976) [hereinafter Husbands, Wives and Divorce]. See also Hoffman, Marital
Instability and the Economic Status of Women, 14 DEMOGRAPHY 67 (1977).
Although Weitzman generally follows the Hoffman & Holmes methodology,
she does not use their data set or their methods of adjustment. Hoffman & Holmes
utilized data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and its income/needs
computation procedure which is similar to that used in the official U.S. poverty
standard.
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First, as might be expected, the dollar income of both divorced
men and women declined, while the income of married couples
rose. Divorced men lost 19 percent in income while divorced
women lost 29 percent. In contrast, married [couples] experienced a 22 percent rise in incomes....
The second finding of the [Hoffman and Holmes] is surprising ....
Over the seven year period, the economic position
[income/needs ratio] of divorced men actually improved by 17
percent. In contrast, over the same period divorced women
experienced a 29 percent decline .... 90
In fact, this last statement is not only "surprising," it is incorrect.
Hoffman and Holmes reported not a twenty-nine percent but only a
6.707o standard of living decline for divorced women 9' (compared to
Weitzman's seventy-three percent!). 92 In addition, although Weitzman
correctly states that Hoffman and Holmes reported a seventeen percent (rounded from 16.5070) improvement in the income/needs ratio
of divorced men, she finesses their finding of an even greater 20.807o
improvement for married couples. 93 In other words, Hoffman and
Holmes reported that ex-husbands achieved only seventy-nine percent

90.

DIVORCE REVOLUTION,

supra note 1, at 337.

91. Husbands, Wives and Divorce, supra note 89, at 31 (Table 2.2). Other

measures in the study actually showed increases for divorced women in income/needs
of 13.3% and 7.5% compared to increases of 35.9% and 35.4% for married women
over the same period. Id. at 33 (Table 2.3); id. at 67 (Table A2.1b).
92. Weitzman's error also appears in her earlier law journal publication of this
information. See Economics of Divorce, supra note 8, at 1250. It was not subsequently
corrected in the hardcover and paperback editions of THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION. It
was also repeated by the court in Kaechele v. Kaechele, No. -, slip op. (10 Dist.
Ohio Nov. 13, 1986). The concurring opinion, in a perceptive caveat, dissociated
itself from the majority's use of Weitzman's statistics:
The matters referred to .

Id.

.

. are obviously based upon evidence not before

us. We, thus, are unable to determine the accuracy of the statistics used or
the propriety of the method used to obtain them. Although such matters
arguably may be considered by a legislative committee in determining
whether to enact special laws, ordinarily they have no place in rendering
judicial decisions which necessarily are limited to determining the rights and
duties of specific parties rather than the establishment of broad principles
of public policy by enactment of special laws.

93. Husbands, Wives and Divorce, supra note 89, at 27 (Table 2.1). Cf
supra note 1, at 337, 481 n.17 ("[Divorced men's 16.5 percent
improvement in income/needs] is closer to the rate of improvement of married
couples who improved their standard of living by [20.8] percent").
DIVORCE REVOLUTION,
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of the standard of living increase achieved by their married counterparts seven years after divorce. 94
B. THE RECENT WORK OF DUNCAN AND HOFFMAN

In the very year that Weitzman published The Divorce Revolution, Hoffman, together with economist Greg J. Duncan, published
an updated version of his work. 95 They demonstrated that divorce
should not be studied as if it were a permanent condition. In their
sample of national data, nearly fifty-five percent of white women and
forty-two percent of black women had remarried within five years of
divorce. The economic status of these remarried women was comparable to that of women who had remained married throughout.
Previous studies have largely ignored the fact that many
divorced people remarry causing a vast improvement in their
economic situation ....
The economic status of women who

do not remarry is a potentially unreliable guide to the situation

women are likely to encounter should they happen to divorce....

Just as it would be inappropriate to assess the economic

impact of job change by focusing exclusively on the period of
unemployment between jobs or on a sample of permanently

unemployed persons, it is equally inappropriate to ignore the
possibility of remarriage in an analysis of the economic consequences of divorce. Many studies of the consequences of

94. This comparison should be interpreted cautiously because divorced income
earners may not be a random subset of all income earners. Nevertheless, it is worthy
of note because a divorced man's standard of living should rise mathematically if
only because his needs - which previously included those of his wife and children automatically go down. The fact that this strictly mathematical boost to his standard
of living fails to produce an overall increase equal to the standard of living increase
enjoyed by continuously married men - coupled with the fact that the latter start
from a higher income level from which relatively higher percentage increases would
not be expected - may be indicative of the unusual financial and household burdens
that divorced men bear.
But cf. Economic Consequences, supra note 32, at 436, 438 (Fig. 14.4), 457
(Table 14.A7), 458 (Table 14.A8) (after one year, divorced men's standard of living
increased less than that of continuously married men, but after five years, divorced
men's standard of living increased at virtually the same rate as that of continuously
married men).

95. See generally Economic Consequences, supra note 32. See also Reconsideration, supra note 16.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

divorce do that, however, by focusing exclusively on a sample

of still-divorced women. 96

In Weitzman's one-year California sample, only four percent to

six percent of the women had remarried. 97 The corresponding figure
from Duncan and Hoffman's national sample after one year is
20.9%.198
Duncan and Hoffman also present an array of data comparing
the income/needs ratios of women and men through the first five

years after divorce. 99 During the first year, women (including those
who remarry and those who do not) experience an average decline of
nine percent (compared to Weitzman's seventy-three percent!). By the

end of the second year, they are back to the standard they enjoyed
before divorce. By the end of the fifth year, they are ten percent
ahead. On average, their standard of living is eighty-one percent that
of divorced men during the first year; by the fifth year it rises to
eighty-five percent of divorced men's standard of living. 1' °
By contrast, divorced women who remain unmarried experience

a decline of thirteen percent during the first year. By the end of the
96. Economic Consequences, supra note 32, at 428, 430.
Weitzman appears to have been aware of these criticisms, DivORCE REVOLUTION,
supra note 1, at 356, but she did not allow them to alter her basic presentation.
97. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 204, 327-28, 333 cf. id. at 204.
98. Economic Consequences, supra note 32, at 452 (Table 14.A.2.).
99. Id. at 437 (Figure 14.3), 458 (Table 14.A.8).
100. These figures which are reflected in Figure 14.3 and Table 14.A.8 of
Economic Consequences, supra note 32, were derived by computing the mean of the
income/needs ratios of all persons in the sample. Larger differences between men
and women would result if a different statistical approach - computing the ratio of
mean income to mean needs of all persons in the sample - had been employed: a
25% average decline in income/needs for all woman by the first year after divorce.
By the fifth year, the average woman enjoys a standard of living equal to 94% of
the standard she enjoyed before divorce and 81% that of the average divorced man.
For women who remain unmarried, the differences are correspondingly greater. Id.
at 457 (Table 14.A.7); Telephone conversation with Professor Saul D. Hoffman (Dec.
7, 1988). See also Hoffman & Duncan, supra note 34, at 644 n.l (1988). The
advantage of the first method is that it relates to individual rather than aggregate
changes in income/needs and is therefore a more accurate reflection of experience.
Letter from Professor Saul D. Hoffman (Feb. 7, 1989) (letter on file with author).
A recent study employing the first method, but based on a sample from the
national Survey of Income and Program Participation, found that the income/needs
ratio of a custodial family which had experienced the departure of the father drops
24% below its intact level by one year after the father's departure. By 2.5 years after
his departure, such family's standard of living rises to 87% of its intact level. Bianchi
& McArthur, supra note 16, (Tables 2 and 5); telephone conversation with Edith
McArthur (May 1, 1989).
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second year, they are still down twelve percent. By the end of the
fifth year, they remain down six percent. On average, their standard
of living is seventy-seven percent that of divorced men during the first
year; by the fifth year it declines to seventy-two percent of divorced
men's standard of living.' 0 '
These numbers do not suggest that divorce is not a serious
financial trauma for many women and for the children in their
custody. It most certainly is, especially for those who remain unmarried. 0 2 But they do demonstrate that Weitzman's results are extreme
and unrepresentative.
C.

INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY IN WEITZMAN'S RESULTS

More recently, Hoffman and Duncan found an internal inconsistency in Weitzman's results.

03

Using her methodology, they worked

back from her reported income/needs ratio decline of seventy-three

percent for ex-wives 1° 4 to determine the decline in income that would
be necessary to produce such a decline in the ratio. Then, they

101. The subsample of women who were remarried by the fifth year after divorce
enjoyed a standard of living equivalent to 960 that of all men. See Economic
Consequences, supra note 32, at 438 (Figure 14.4), 458 (Table 14.A.8).
102. Duncan & Hoffman note that poverty rates (i.e., income less than needs)
for divorced women (who do not remarry) and their children rise dramatically, though
this higher incidence is limited almost exclusively to black women and children and
to white women and children whose pre-divorce family income levels were below the
median. Id. at 438.
They conclude that the remarriage of women who remained unmarried in their
sample would probably not have provided the same benefits that remarriage afforded
those who did remarry because of the unlikelihood that the unremarried women
could have attracted husbands with sufficiently high incomes. Id. at 446-50, 461
(table 14.A. 11). See also Reconsideration, supra note 16, at 495.
Weitzman claims that there is a link between the economic consequences of
divorce, the rise in the number of female-headed single familes and the "rise in

female poverty."

DIVORCE REVOLUTION,

supra note 1, at 351. A new review of the

data has indicated, however, that - contrary to popular impression - there has
been no recent rise in female poverty. Moreover, although there has been a rise in
the incidence of poverty among children, this is not primarily the result of the growth
of female-headed families but reflects a relative fall in income of all households with
children. WoMEN's QUEST, supra note 23, at 76, 84-89, 107-108. Cf. Labor Market,
supra note 23, at 18-23 (although female poverty has dropped by two-thirds - from
34% to 110%since 1940, the percentage of poor, who are women has risen from 50%
to 62% because with the accelerating breakup of the two-spouse family since 1940
the children have continued to live with the mother who typically earns less than the
father).
103. Hoffman & Duncan, supra note 34, at 641.

104.

DIVORCE REVOLUTION,

supra note 1, at 338-39.
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compared this result with the decline in ex-wives' income which
Weitzman herself reports elsewhere in The Divorce Revolution.105 The
two did not match. Weitzman's reported income decline was substantially less than the amount required to produce her reported seventythree percent decline in income/needs. In other words, given Weitzman's data on the decline in women's income after divorce, her
computed decline in their income/needs ratio after divorce must be
much too large. 1° Weitzman would not give Hoffman and Duncan
access to her original data set to replicate her findings. 107
D.

THE "DISADVANTAGED"

WIFE

As noted, Weitzman has marshaled no evidence to support her
contention that husbands and marriage are to blame for the forty
percentage point income gap between men and women. According to
Hoffman, the best estimate of its causes is that roughly sixteen of the
forty percentage points are due to discontinuities in women's labor
market activity, 08 which include time spent with children; 1' 9 the other

twenty-four percentage points are due to differences in employment
opportunities and gender-based treatment which are extrinsic to mar-

105. Id. at 326, 328, 333.
106. Using Weitzman's published data and methodology, Hoffman & Duncan
derived an average decline in income/needs (computing the ratio of mean income to
mean needs) of 33% compared to Weitzman's 73%. Hoffman & Duncan, supra note
34, at 643.
107. Id. at 644 n.3.
For the general problem of unreplicated research, see, e.g., Fraud in Medical
Research Tied to Lax Rules, N. Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1989, at 23 (findings are often
not checked by replication and the peer review system depends on trust that can be
misplaced); Bishop, Health Studies' 'Cause-Effect' ClaimsMay Overstate Life's Risk,
Scientist Says, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1988, at B4 (statistical studies given undue credence
because they do not provide adequate analyses of underlying cause-effect relationships); Halloran, Pivotal S.L.A. Marshall Book on Warfare Assailed as False, N.Y.
Times, February 19, 1989, p. 1 (major work by prominent military historian appears
to have been based on unfounded statistics); Pollack, In Science, Error Isn't Fraud,
N.Y. Times, May 2, 1989, p. 27 (the freedom to make honest mistakes is at the core
of the scientific process, and it is wrong to presume that error indicates bad faith or
fraudulent intent).
108. Duncan's estimate is somewhat lower. See YEARS OF POVERTY, supra note
22, at 168 (no more than about one-third (13.2 percentage points out of 40) of the
malq-female wage gap is due to discontinuities in the labor force). See also Wage
Effects, supra note 25, at 579 (marriage, apart from childrearing, produces no
negative wage effects for women).
109. The rewards and compensations of childrearing which women acquire in
exchange for diminished income are of course not accounted for here.
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should be
riage. "° Weitzman's recommendation that ex-husbands
1 1 to close the gap" 2
legally obligated to pay a "marital pension"'
could at best apply only to that fraction (if any) of the sixteen
percentage points due to labor market discontinuity and caused specifically by marriage." 3
However, if compensation is to be paid for bearing marital
burdens, then husbands also have a claim to submit. As we have seen,
marriage and remarriage are among the best enhancers of a woman's
standard of living. By supporting his wife during marriage, a husband
5
incurs increased needs" 4 and endures a lower standard of living.", In
so doing, he effectively closes the entire wage gap which his wife
6
otherwise would have to face alone in the workplace."1 Therefore,
110. Divorce and Economic Well-being, supra note 62, at 22.
111. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 390.
112. But cf. Divorce and Economic Well-being, supra note 62, at 22: "Even if
child support awards were more generous, and complete compliance could be
obtained, many women and children would still suffer a decline in their living
standards after divorce, simply because women continue to fare more poorly in the
labor market than men."
113. The fact that marriage is a voluntary relationship which involves a "deserved" trade-off of advantages is not considered here. See generally YEARS OF
POVERTY, supra note 22. Similarly not considered is the speculative and costly nature
of the statistical procedure which would have to be employed to quantify the actual
dollar amount of the various components of the "gap" in any particular marriage.
114. Although some studies have shown a positive correlation between marriage
and men's wage income (to be distinguished from men's income/needs ratio or
standard of living), the causal connection between these two variables remains
undetermined. It is unclear whether marriage makes men more productive, whether
the market place discriminates in favor of hiring and/or promoting married men,
whether men make the decision to marry based upon favorable wage levels, or
whether other causal factors account for the correlation. Since unmarried white men
and black women with large numbers of children also receive higher wages than their
counterparts with fewer family responsibilities (after controlling for worker qualification), it is possible that a husband's wage premium is at least partially driven by
the needs generated by children. See Wage Effects supra note 25, at 592. Cf. S.
KORENMAN & D. NEUMARK, DoEs MARRIAGE REALLY MAKE MEN MORE PRODUCTIVE?
(Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 29, Div. of Research and Statistics,
Federal Reserve Board 1988) (the male "marriage premium" of about 2.5 percent
per year arises from slow wage growth and the location of married workers generally
in higher paying job grades - due to their higher performance and productivity ratings
-rather than to married workers receiving higher pay for equivalent work within job
grades).
115. In order to be consistent with Weitzman's approach, the non-monetary
advantages to men of marriage and children are not accounted for in this calculation.

116. See Duncan & Morgan, Persistence and Change in Economic Status and

the Role of ChangingFamily Composition, in 9 FIVE

THOUSAND AMEmCAN

FAmrmms-
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according to Weitzman's own legal calculus, divorced women should
actually reimburse their ex-husbands for the superior standard of
living which only their marriages could have provided."'
V.

A.

WEITZMAN'S

ANIMus

TOWARD JOINT CUSTODY

JOINT CUSTODY AS A MODEL FOR POST-DIVORCE ECONOMIC
JUSTICE

Central to the thrust of Weitzman's economic argument are the
children who remain with the custodial parent, usually the mother.
The more children in the mother's custody, the higher the needs figure
in her income/needs ratio and therefore the lower her ratio." 8 Weitzman's solution to a custodial mother's low income/needs ratio is to
increase her income by imposing large, additional alimony and child
support obligations upon her ex-husband." 9
PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 1, 18 (G. Duncan & J. Morgan eds. 1981):
Marriage was associated with a dramatic increase in the economic status
of the initially unmarried female household heads. Relative to those who
remained unmarried, female heads who married enjoyed family income
increases averaging $16,000, a doubled chance of keeping up with inflation,
and an adjusted family income growth rate that was 10 percentage points
higher. Marriage added to the needs standard as well as to income, so the
growth in income/needs was not as large as for income alone, but it was
still impressive.
"For men, marriage or remarriage resulted in very small increases in income and
a substantially reduced likelihood of keeping income/needs growing faster than
inflation." Id. at 37.
See also WOMEN'S QUEST, supra note 23, at 79-80 (assuming income is equally shared,
the effective income of married women, taking account of economies of scale, is
higher than that of non-married women).
117. Cf. Divorce and Economic Well-being, supra note 62, at 22:
In a sense, women gain financially from marriage by partial access to
the income of better-paid men, and they lose financially when their marriages
are dissolved. That result is compounded when a woman's own labor market
prospects are reduced as a consequence of her marriage, as in the case of
women who stay home and raise a family.
118. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 341. Cf. MaritalDisruption, supra
note 20, at 172, 185 (probably because the children usually remain with the mother,
the standard of living of ex-husbands goes up while that of ex-wives goes down). See
also Husbands, Wives and Divorce, supra note 89, at 62 (since children generally
remain with the ex-wife, economic status of the ex-husband improves).
119. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 387-93. Any support payment-be
it characterized as alimony or child support-will inure at least in part to the benefit
of the custodial parent. This is because money is fungible, the custodial parent is not
required to account for the spending of support payments, the court does not
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An alternate method would be to reduce the custodial mother's
needs. This could be accomplished by instituting some form of joint
custody 20 arrangement between the parents.' 2' Mathematically, as well
as practically, joint custody would raise the mother's income/needs
ratio and lower the father's without requiring large, additional support
payments from the father to the mother. 122
Therefore, joint custody is the special enemy of The Divorce
Revolution.

23

supervise child support expenditures, and there are common household expenditures
which the parent and child will share in any event. See Mnookin & Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 960962 [hereinafter Bargaining in the Shadow]; ALLOCATION OF INCOME, supra note 50,
at 151, 184-85. See also Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3026 n.14 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (an assumption that child support payments are typically
used for the entire family's needs is entirely reasonable).
120. Joint custody herein means that the parents share legal responsibility for
major childrearing decisions such as education, health care and religious training,
and that the children reside a maximal - though not necessarily an equal - amount
of time with each parent. See generally 1 J. ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CUSTODY
PRACTICE, 355-389 (1986 & Supp. 1988).

121. Although there is some evidence that children placed in sole paternal custody
fare much better economically than those placed in sole maternal custody, see, e.g.,
Duncan & Morgan, Young Children and "Other" Family Members, in 4 FIVE
THOUsAND AMERIcAN FAMILES-PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 158 (G. Duncan
& J. Morgan eds. 1976); Bianci & McArthur, supra note 16, at 6-7, this custodial
option is not broached here for the following reasons: (1) the loss to children under
sole paternal custody of a custodial relationship with their mother is likely to prove
as damaging to them as the loss of a custodial relationship to their father under sole
maternal custody; (2) the loss of parenting role to a mother under sole paternal
custody is likely to be as devastating as the loss of parenting role to a father under
sole maternal custody; (3) sole paternal custody would not likely generate any greater
cooperation between the parents than sole maternal custody; and (4) even if the
preceding concerns about sole paternal custody were to prove unfounded, or if its
economic advantages to children were found to outweigh its non-economic disadvantages, sole paternal custody would not likely be given serious consideration as a
standard award in the contemporary cultural climate.
Weitzman opposes the use of economic criteria in custody determinations, even
though she acknowledges the importance of economic circumstances to a child's
development, because such criteria discriminate against mothers and favor fathers.
DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 240-41, 318-21. The fact that her proposed
"primary parent" presumption discriminates against their fathers and favors mothers
for precisely the same reasons does not seem to stimulate her social conscience
correspondingly.
122. Cf. YEARS OF POVERTY, supra note 22, at 168: "[O]ur results . .. suggest
that there may be ways in which working couples could combine their family and
work roles more efficiently and thus reduce at least some of the 'deserved' portion
of the earnings gap."
123. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 245-56, 393-95. Weitzman's great
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WEITZMAN'S "PRIMARY PARENT" PRESUMPTION

Based largely on a speculative interpretation of her interview data
("the fathers' expressed interest in custody fluctuates depending on
how the question is asked"), 124 Weitzman concludes that fathers are
not really interested in obtaining custody. 25 Their real motive lies in
threatening a custody battle to extort reduced claims for support from
their ex-wives. 126 Since, by contrast, mothers normally assume primary
responsibility for the care and nurture of the children during marriage 12
and genuinely desire sole custody after divorce,' 12 the law should
enshrine these tendencies in a "primary parent" presumption favoring
sole custody to the mother and allow joint custody only if the parents
(in effect, the mother 29) agree to it.13° Thereupon, "[tihe parent with
fear, succinctly put, is that joint custody gives fathers "a new justification for
reducing child support." Id. at 394.

124.

DIVORCE REVOLUTION,

supra note 1, at 243. Weitzman fails to convincingly

125.

DIVORCE REVOLUTION,

supra note 1, at 244, 261.

resolve certain contradictory trends in her custody findings: for example, a "significant portion" of custodial mothers wish that the non-custodial father would visit the
children more often. Id. at 230, 298; yet, "43 percent of them ... wanted the noncustodial [father] to see the kids less often." Id. at 259; "77 percent of the fathers
... said that 'missing the children' is one of the worst results of divorce." Id. at
258; yet, "70 percent of men without custody said they would prefer to see their
children less often . . ." Id. (emphasis in original). "[Wihether or not a father has
joint legal custody does not seem to affect his compliance with child support orders"
Id. at 255; yet, quoting a court case approvingly, " 'Parents, when deprived of the
custody of their children, very often refuse to do for such children what natural
instinct would ordinarily prompt them to do.' " Id. at 280.
126. Id. at 224, 255 note, 310-18.
127. Id. at 245.
128. Id.at 243-44, 261.

129. See Kelly, Examining Resistance to Joint Custody, in JOINT CUSTODY AND
43-44 (J. Folberg ed. 1984) ("parental-veto" type of joint custody

SHARED PARENTING

effectively enhances a mother's quest for Sole custody). The "primary paient"
presumption has been popularized by R. NEELY, THE DIVORCE DECISION 79-83 (1984)

[hereinafter

DIVORCE DECISION].

Neely is a justice of the West Virginia Supreme

Court.
For a lively exchange between two supporters of the "primary parent" presumption, see, Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984) (partisan, but candid, comprehensive, reasoned,
objective, though necessarily inconclusive review of the available literature and
analysis of the adventages of the "primary parent" presumption); Fineman and Opie,
The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinationsat
Divorce, 1987 WIsc. L. REV. 107 (tendentious, schodlmarmish lecture on the threat
to "critical" legal analysis and revisionist feminism posed by Chambers' candor and
objectivity, but a reminder of the difficulties inherent in using the often ambiguous
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custody can justly assert a greater need for the family's re-

findings of social science as a basis for legal and public policy; Chambers, The
Abuses of Social Science: A Response to Fineman and Opie, 1987 Wisc. L. REV.
159: Fineman, A Reply to David Chambers, 1987 Wisc. L. REV. 165.
130. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 393-95.
The distinction between voluntary and court-ordered joint custody is something
of a red herring. Cf. Process of Negotiation, supra note 11, at 1158-1162 (negotiated
settlements are often as unstable and as disagreeable to both parties as court-imposed
arrangements). In jurisdictions which empower a court to order joint custody in the
best interest of a child, even over the objection of a parent, there are relatively many
voluntary joint custody arrangements compared to jurisdictions which do not allow
courts to enter joint custody awards unless both parents affirm agreement to joint
custody. Joint custody naturally becomes more voluntary when, otherwise, courts
are empowered to order it in the best interest of the child. See, e.g., Mclsaac, CourtConnected Mediation, 21 CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 49, 57-59 (1983) [hereinafter

Mediation] (relatively high percentage of voluntary joint custody agreements reached
in Los Angeles where court may order joint custody over objection of a parent); E.
Maccoby, R. Mnookin & C. Depner, Post-Divorce Families: Custodial Arrangements
Compared 5, 13 (paper presented at meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, Philadelphia, May, 1986) [hereinafter Post-Divorce Families] (nearly three quarters of sample families with custody arrangements agreed to
joint legal custody in two California counties where court may order joint custody
over objection of a parent); Cf. Final Report, Findings and Recommendations of the
Domestic Relations Task Force (Section on Custody) (submitted to the Ohio General
Assembly, June 30, 1987) .(relatively few joint custody agreements found in Ohio
where court may not order joint custody over objection of a parent). See also F.
Sonenstein & C. Calhoun, The Survey of Absent Parents: Pilot Results 35, 37,
Appendix A at 7 (1988) (U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Office of the
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation) [hereinafter The Survey of Absent Parents],
(the rate of joint custody outcomes in sample from Florida which allows courtordered joint custody is about twice that of sample from Ohio which does not allow
court-ordered joint custody). Reportedly, less than 5% of the joint custody cases
studied in Post-Divorce Families were actually imposed by a court. See Glazer, Joint
Custody: Is It Good for Children?, EDITORIAL REs. REP. (Feb. 3, 1989). But cf.
Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 119, at 980 (joint custody would probably not
work in the absence of parental agreement). The authors greatly over-estimate the
need for a priori parental cooperation in joint custody. See F. Williams, Child
Custody and Parental Cooperation (Aug. 1987) (paper presented to the American
Bar Association, Family Law Section Council, San Francisco) [hereinafter Cooperation] (parental cooperation develops most often and is most often sustained between
initially ucooperative divorcing parents in a carefully structured joint custodial
arrangement). Williams is Director of Family and Child Psychiatry at Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center, Los Angeles. Finally, it should be noted that court-ordered sole
custody, the default American custody award, is always imposed over the objection
of the resultant non-custodial parent, and the court-ordered visitation component of
such award is often imposed over the objection of the custodial parent, all of which
is functionally indistinguishable from court-ordered joint custody.
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",131

REBUTTALS TO WEITZMAN'S "PRIMARY PARENT" PRESUMPTION

From a strictly negotiating perspective, it is difficult to understand
how a father's insincere request for joint custody could advance his
quest for lower support payments. Knowing his insincerity, all a
mother need do is call his bluff. 132 This tactic would confront him
131. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 385.
132. Curiously, Weitzman acknowledges this:
Most attorneys we interviewed said they dismissed such threats as 'hot air'
and 'posturing,' and predicted that they did not succeed. As one attorney
reported:
In one case, the husband said he was going to fight for custody of
the kids, so I called his bluff and said, 'Okay, take the kids.' Boy
did he cave in! That scared the hell out of him.
Id. at 224-25.
Weitzman, however, maintains that the very lawyers who successfully parry
insincere quests by fathers for custody are unsuccessful in convincing their own
clients-the mothers-that they have done so. Id. at 225.
Though this vignette occurred in the context of a claim for sole custody, there
is no reason to believe that an insincere joint custody claim would engender a
different outcome. But cf. Erlanger, Chambliss & Melli, Participationand Flexibility
in Informal Processes: Cautions From the Divorce Context, 21 L. AND Soc'Y REV.
585, 600 (1985) (against custody threats, a lawyer's reassurances and support may be
insufficient to keep clients from folding). See also Bargaining in the Shadow, supra
note 119, at 979 (even a risk-averse mother who is not certain that the father is
insincere in seeking custody can expect a better bargaining advantage in a joint
custody jurisdiction than in a jurisdiction which will only grant sole custody to either
parent). But cf. also, Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining:The Limits on Private Ordering,
18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1015, 1025 (1985) (in jurisdiction which provides for joint
custody, father who sincerely seeks joint custody and who knows mother's preference
for sole custody may have the greater bargaining power); id. at 1032-1033 (insincere
father may threaten custody fight to push mother into accepting less support; the
mother may agree to less support in exchange for the father's severing his contact
with the child, not because of the child's need, but because the mother despises the
father and wants nothing more to do with him).
But see DIVORCE DECISION, supra note 129, at 60 ("I never represented a father
who wanted custody of his children ....
[S]uch men are rare.") Neely describes
how he induced one of his first clients, an adulterous father in rural West Virginia
who did not want custody, to engage in "blustering threats" of a "protracted custody
battle" in order to "settle the whole divorce cheaply." Id. at 63-64. He does not
indicate whether his client's wife had equally gifted counsel, if any. Neely moved on
to become a justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court whence, transfigured, he
emerged as a leading exponent of the "primary parent" presumption; Felder, Mother,
Kids and Feminism, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1989, op. ed. page (unethical lawyers spur
fathers into spurious custody claims to secure economic concessions from their wives
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with the prospect of custodial responsibilities which he does not
want-plus undiminished child support obligations. In virtually all
states, parents cannot bargain away their children's interest in child
support. It is the court's responsibility to order a reasonable and
necessary amount from the parent who can afford it; parental agreement to the contrary is simply not binding on the court."'
thus contaminating the meritorious claims of other fathers). Felder goes on to argue
that "common sense dictates" that fit mothers should always get custody and
reassume their traditional homebound roles. He does not address how this can be
done by working mothers. He also argues that "common sense dictates that custody
should not be determined according to some third party's perception, whether a
judge or a psychiatrist." He does not appear to consider his own "common sense"
determinations to be those of a third party. Elsewhere, Felder has been described as
a "rich-woman's divorce lawyer" who extracts large awards from ex-husbands and
who claims never to have lost a case. See Heller, Mr. Splitsville, Chicago Tribune,
Dec. 5, 1988, § 5 at 1. A divorce pitting Neely against Felder as opposing counsel
should prove illuminating.
Weitzman appears to be inconsistent in her estimate of the percentage of
divorcing husbands who insincerely threaten to contest custody. On the one hand,
she claims that one-third of the divorced women in her sample reported that their
husbands had "threatened" to ask for custody as a "ploy" in negotiations and that
"many" (she does not indicate how many) of these "threats" appear to have been
motivated by financial gain. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 310. On the
other hand, she claims that only 4007o of the divorced men in the sample seriously
considered the idea of obtaining custody and that ultimately only 13% actually
requested custody on their divorce petitions. Id. at 243-244. Even if one were to
assume that all 13% of these fathers were insincere and further that some of those
who did not file for custody had already intimidated their wives into settling for
diminished support and thus did not need to file, it does not appear that insincere
fathers amount to one-third of the sample. In any event and under either view,
insincere fathers are a distinct minority in Weitzman's own sample.
133. See, e.g., the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act:
Section 306:
(b) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . the terms of the
separation agreement, except those providing for the support, custody and
visitation of children, are binding upon the court. .. ;
(f) Except for terms concerning the support, custody or visitation of children,
the decree may expressly preclude or limit modification or terms set forth
in the decree if the separation agreement so provides. ...
Section 309:
[Child Support] In a proceeding for the dissolution of marriage . . . the
court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child
to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support ....
UNNIORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 306, 309, 9A U.L.A. 216, 400 (1973);
Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 201.004 (emphasis added).

For an analysis of the relationship between the above statutory regime and joint

custody, see Abraham, An Interpretation of Illinois' New Joint Custody Amend-
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In addition, most states have enacted minimum child support
guidelines for the benefit of the custodial parent, usually the mother,
ments, 75 Ill. B.J. 332, 338-340 (1987).
See also Blisset v. Blisset, 144 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 495 N.E.2d 608, 611 (4th Dist.
1986) (agreement by custodial mother to forego child support payments in exchange
for father's agreement to forego visitation held contrary to public policy):
The determination of child support is the court's responsibility and not the
parties['] . . . .Parties to divorce or dissolution matters should not be allowed
to contract away their responsibilities especially as it [sic.] deals with child
support ....
Child support as a part of a dissolution proceeding is the
subject of negotiation in many cases. Its practice is a necessary part of these
types of proceedings, but it always must be kept in mind that it is the
court's responsibility and not the parties['] to determine the adequacy of
child support and the amount of child support.
See also Cox v. Cox,
- P.2d
(Alaska 1989) (reported at 15 Fam. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1434 (July 18, 1989)) (held, divorcing couple's agreement to belowguideline child support payments was properly rejected by trial court).
For the argument that judges generally do not fulfill their responsibility to review
divorce agreements, including the adequacy of child support arrangements, see, e.g.,
Process of Negotiation, supra note 11, at 1144-1147. The authors also found, however,
that the supporting parent's income was a major determinant of the level of support
and they concluded that this finding should dispel some of the concern about the
failure of child support awards to reflect parental ability to pay. Id. at 1164-1165.
They further note that custodial mothers who were impatient for the divorce tended
to settle for relatively low child support payments. Id. at 1168-69. Since many more
women than men petition for divorce, see Children of Divorce, supra note 25, and
since petitioners are likely to be more impatieht than respondents, see No-Foult
Divorce, supra note 11, it is possible that ldw child support awards are in part a
function of some custodial mothers' preference for immediate independence over
enhanced child support.
Weitzman's treatment of the problem of non-compliance by non-custodial fathers
with court-ordered child support is not directly addressed in this critique. Suffice it
to note here that it reflects many of the difficulties which characterize her treatment
of divorce economics and custody. See, e.g., CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTIONS, supra
note 59, at 6-8, 54-61 (Weitzman's estimate of absent fathers' income is inflated,
being nearly twice as large as other available estimates, and data from sample of
predominantly low income, often unemployed black absent fathers who maintained
ongoing positive relationships with their children reveal that 38% paid the full amount
of child support owed, 73% paid over one half, the median payment as a percentage
of the amount owed was 93o01 and the mean was 7106, averaging 20% of their gross

income, while approximately 75076 gave additional non-court ordered support of
various types); The Survey of Absent Parents, supra note 130, at 26-31 (in one of

the few studies to survey non-custodial child support payors as well as custodial
payees, the payors report paying between 80-93% of the amount ordered, while the
payees report receiving only between 55-83% of their awards, the truth probably
being somewhere in the middle). See also National Council For Children's Rights,
Fathers Pay Child Support: HHS Hides Report, 4 SPEAK OUT FOR CHILDREN 1
(1989); A Study Suggests that FathersPay 6hild Support, 20 BEHAV. TODAY 3 (Feb.
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pursuant to federal law.

a4

There are no corresponding minimum

visitation guidlines for the benefit of the non-custodial parent, usually
the father. This incongruity tips the bargaining advantage to the
mother: she may threaten to seek support in excess of the minimum
unless the father abandons his quest for joint custody.'3 5
13, 1989) (Department of Health and Human Services suppressed and refused to
continue funding for The Survey of Absent Parents, which was released only after a
Freedom of Information Act request and which shows fathers report paying significantly more child support than mothers report receiving, thus leaving the U.S.
Census, which queries only payees and not payors, as the major governmental
statistical source to justify child support policy); cf. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra
note 1, at 295 (two-thirds of women interviewed reported difficulty collecting child
support but only 110o of the men perceived any problem). Weitzman does not fully
develop the import of this information for a balanced assesment of fathers' compliance with child support obligations. See also CILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY, supra
note 15 at 11 (Table H); 9 NUMBERS NEWS 3 (May, 1989) (Census Bureau reports
that mothers who had married and then were divorced or separated won child support
awards in 8207o of cases and 750o of those who had not remarried received some
payment on such awards). Telephone conversation with Dianne Crispell, Associate

Editor of

NUMBERS NEWS

(May 2, 1989).

Moreover, the major reasons for fathers' non-compliance with child support
orders seem to be fathers' episodic unemployment and their belief that mothers do
not spend their child support payments on the children. CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTIONS,
supra note 59, at 60-63. See also ALLOCATION OF INCOME, supra note 50, at 125-26:
[A] $100 addition to the family income results in the average child receiving
only about one-tenth of that increase . . . . [If this] is indicative of the
extent to which a transfer is diverted from the children, [it] could help
explain why noncustodial parents are so notoriously unreliable in providing
support for their children.
Cf. Supporting Children, supra note 87, at 338. The authors insensitively conclude
that findings such as these argue for extensive use of automatic wage withholding.
But cf. Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3026 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
"A father is entitled to support his child, and the child is entitled to look to the
father for this support." "Regardless of the benevolence with which it is issued, a
Government check is no substitute for the personal support of a loving father." Id.
at 3034. See also CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY, supra note 15, at 15 (Table J) (mean
child support payments received by custodial mothers directly from non-custodial
fathers were 3807o greater than mean payments received through a court or public
agency, and such amounts constituted 6907o of the amounts due compared to 60%
under court or public agency intermediation).
It should also be noted that while Weitzman expressly recognizes that the prospect
of loss of custody by mothers "undermines women's incentives to invest in their
children," DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 370, she resists the corollary that
the endemic loss of custody by fathers may have correspondingly greater effects upon
men.
134. See generally Social Security Act, Part IV, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651667 (1982).
135. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Serna, 172 I11.App. 3d 1051, 527 N.E.2d 627
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Moreover, a father who insincerely bargains for-and somehow
gets-joint custody in exchange for lower support obligations will
likely find he has not made much of a deal: the costs of a joint
custody household have been reported to range from twenty-five
percent to fifty-eight percent greater than the costs of a single36
individual household.

As to the genuineness of fathers' quest for joint custody, perhaps
the most monumental evidence is that cited by Weitzman herself: that
between 1980 and 1985 some thirty states enacted some form of joint

custody law. 37 These laws were passed primarily in response to the
desire of fathers to maintain a parenting relationship with their
children despite their divorces.1 8

Finally, it should be obvious that Weitzman's "primary parent"
presumption is but a transparent disguise for sole maternal custody.3 9
(4th,Dist. 1988) (held statutory child support guidelines are minimums which the
court in its discretion may exceed without express findings).
It should also be noted that while the child support obligations of non-custodial
fathers are enforceable by a variety of strong-arm measures-including wage assignments, automatic wage withholding, tax-refund intercepts, liens on property, bonds,
fines and jail terms-violations by custodial mothers of the visitation rights of noncustodial fathers are not generally remediable other than by contempt proceedings.
Judges, however, are naturally loath to jail custodial mothers for contempt or to
expose the children to forcible removal by the sheriff. See, e.g., Sullivan, Locking
Out Dad, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 1, 1989, § 7, at 7. The general availability of
effective enforcement measures on behalf of mothers but not fathers further tips the
bargaining advantage in favor of mothers: a mother may threaten to impede a father's
visitation, without fear of his retaliating by withholding child support payments,
unless he increases support beyond what the court has ordered. Cf. Bargainingin the
Shadow, supra note 119, at 965 n.56:
[Withholding support to enforce visitation] is not as normatively distasteful,
in terms of its effect on the child, as it may seem at first glance. If
withholding support payments is an effective way of ensuring that the
custodial spouse will not interfere with court-ordered visitation, it is certainly
not as potentially damaging to the child as the legally sanctioned alternatives:
calling out the sheriff to force surrender of the child, or moving for a
contempt order that would put the custodial parent in jail until a promise
to comply with visitation is exacted.
136. Patterson, The Added Costs of Shared Lives, in JOINT CUSTODY AND
SHARED PARENTING 75 (J.
Folberg ed. 1984).
137. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note I, at 245.
138. See generally H. JACOB, THE SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORKATION OF
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 127-144 (1988). See also CmLD SUPPORT
COLLECTIONS, supra note 59, at vi (in sample of predominantly low income black
absent fathers, portrait which emerges, unlike the portrait of absent fathers that
often appears in the media, is one of commitment both to payment of child support
and to the well-being of their children).
139. "[The] list of criteria [for West Virginia's 'primary caretaker parent'
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It is designed to perpetuate a low post-divorce income/needs ratio for
mothers and thus secure for them a claim for large, additional support
payments from fathers.14° It takes no account of children's on-going
developmental needs for two involved parents141 or of fathers' needs
42
to remain involved in the lives of their children. 1
Indeed, a recent study raises fundamental doubts about the very
existence of a "primary parent" in the average divorcing family:
About half of parents' primary child care time is spent doing
... dressing, feeding, or otherwise tending to the physical
needs of children. Another 15 percent is spent chauffeuring
children to school, to lessons, or to other places. The remaining one-third is spent interacting with children - talking to
them, helping them with homework, or playing with them.
While mothers may spend more time caring for their children
than fathers do [mothers spend 9 hours a week doing primary
presumption] usually spells 'mother'. . . . Our rule inevitably involves some injustice
to 'fathers.' DIVORCE DECISION, supra note 129, at 79-80.

140. "By constructing the unhappy economic situation of women and children
after divorce as a social problem stemming from divorce, it is possible for interested
groups to draw attention to the rising divorce rate and to express concern about the
lack of stability in marriage in an acceptable manner." Social Problem, supra note
68, at 762.
Weitzman acknowledges that "wise public policy should discourage the use of
children as pawns for financial gain. . . ." DIVORcE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at
386, 490 n.101. Although she applies this dictum to "uninterested" fathers who seek
custody and are thus in position to claim-or at least not pay-child support, she
does not apply it to her "primary parent" presumption which is designed to further
the custodial and child support interests of mothers and is thus a consummate use
of children as pawns for financial gain.
Rather, Weitzman contends that the "primary parent" presumption, by favoring
mothers, would "decrease ambiquity" in custody determinations. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 245, 394. However, a decrease of ambiquity is a Pyrrhic
victory if it comes at the expense of fairness. Moreover, a presumption favoring joint
custody-which would maximize fairness to parents as well as to children-would
also decrease ambiquity by favoring a custodial relationship for both parents, but
such a presumption does not appeal to Weitzman, notwithstanding. Id. at 247.
141. See generally M. RoMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT (1978);
THF ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT (M. Lamb ed., 2d ed. 1981). But
cf. Furstenberg, Morgan & Allison, PaternalParticipationand Children's Well-Being
After Marital Dissolution, 52 AM. Soc. REv. 695 (1987) (in sample with generally
low incidence of father-child contact after divorce, no consistent influence of such
contact on children's well-being was detected).
142. See generally FATHERHOOD AND FAMY POLICY (M. Lamb & A. Sagi eds.
1983).
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child care; fathers spend 3 hours a week], fathers spend just
as much time in primary interaction as do mothers.... To
the extent that this is the most enjoyable and influential time
parents spend with children (i.e., "quality" time), fathers get
proportionately more of it.
Children [living in single-parent households] receive 2 to 3
fewer hours of care per week from the custodial parent than
do children in two-parent households. Children who live only
with their mother, then, lose 3 hours a week of care from
their mothers, plus 3 hours a week of care by the absent
father.
[A]s more mothers ... become single parents, the amount of
time children spend with [both] parents is likely to fall. 143

143. Robinson, Caring For Kids, 11 Am. DEMOGRAPHICS 52, 52 (July, 1989)
(emphasis added).
A "son of 'primary parent' " argument recently has been advanced by Fuchs,
not to justify sole maternal custody but to explain the male-female wage gap.
WOMEN's QUEST, supra note 23, at 68-70. Fuchs concludes that on average "women
have a stronger demand for children than men do." Among the evidence he offers
for women's stronger demand is data adduced by Post-Divorce Familes, supra note
130, showing a preponderance in California of maternal residential custody, even in
joint custodial arrangements.
This is very flimsy evidence in an otherwise weighty work. Fuchs ignores other
data in Post-Divorce Familes that fathers are "increasingly more satisfied the more
contact they have with their children." Post-Divorce Familes, supra note 130, at 89. This would suggest that fathers' "demand" for children is not fully translated
into custody awards-due perhaps to the intercession of legal and judicial impediments, see Reidy, Silver & Carlson, Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges 23
FAm. L. Q. 75, 86 (1989) (preference of surveyed California judges is for limited
joint custody rather than full joint custody, despite statutory preference for joint
custody), or perhaps to a realization by fathers that the children also need their
mothers.
Fuchs likewise ignores the fact that maternal custody is a relatively recent
phenomenon in common law countries which historically favored paternal custody,
and that joint custody is of even more recent vintage. See generally Folberg &
Graham, Joint Custody of Children After Divorce, 12 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 523,
530-532 (1979). Given this additional information, would Fuchs conclude that in
former times women's demand for children was weaker than men's?
In addition, the distribution of American custodial arrangements may differ at
any time from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This further suggests that law and custom
may exercise an important influence on the underlying "demand" for custody. (And
what conclusion would Fuchs draw from the situation in many non-Western, tradi-
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Interestingly, in the period before she discovered the advocacy
value of custody-driven low income/needs ratios, Weitzman held a
rather different view of presumptions favoring sole maternal custody
and of the sincerity of fathers' quest for custody:
[A] deference for the mother may have the [detrimental] social
effect of . . . reinforcing [a w/pman's] social roles as housewife
and mother and-in many cases-her dependency on her
husband for support.
The practice of automatically giving the mother custody of
the children can have two other detrimental effects. First, it
may not take sufficient, if any, account of the needs of the
children and the qualifications of the parents involved. Second,
in practice, it has the ultimate effect of causing the mother to
bear the greater, if not the total, financial burden of child
tional societies where custody is routinely given to fathers?)
A failure to account for the effects of legal constraints might also lead to the
equally unwarranted conclusion that men have a stronger demand for children than
women do because women demand more abortions than men do. A change in the
law (which is not recommended) to allow men an equal overriding right to abort
unwanted children might produce a different "demand" comparison. Cf. Eggs in
Their Face, 7 THE MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST 2 (March, 1989); Embryos in a Divorce
Case: Joint Property or Offspring?, The N.Y. Times, April 22, 1989, at 1; Curriden,
Frozen Embryos: The New Frontier, 75 A.B.A. J. 68 (August, 1989) (divorcing

husband opposes desire by wife to reimplant her frozen eggs, which were fertilized
by his sperm, to bear a child).
Moreover, Fuchs, in attempting to explain the contemporary low American
birthrate, notes that "[tihere are undoubtedly many childless men who would like to
be fathers, but only under terms and conditions that women find unacceptable. There
are undoubtedly many women who want to have children (or more children), but
not if they must play a subservient role in a hierarchical marriage." Wo~MN's QUEST,
supra note 23, at 102. If so, women's "demand" for children would not seem to
survive even traditional marriage.
Finally, Fuchs volunteers that even if it could be shown that women's quest for
economic equality has had harmful effects on children, it is unlikely that women will
abandon their quest, which he regards as "legitimate." See id. at 115. Under such
circumstances, how "legitimate" is women's "demand" for the children they are
resolved to harm?

It might nevertheless be true that women ultimately have a stronger "demand"
to bear and subsequently to care for children than to have careers. Men do not have
this conflict of demands because men cannot bear children and, consequently, do
not ordinarily expect to be the primary caretakers of their children in an intact
marriage. But this would not imply, as Fuchs concludes, that men have less concern
for their children than women do. See id.' at 68, 140-41.
Fuchs' other evidence, such as fathers' purportedly poor performance in meeting
their child support obligations, is subject to related objections.
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support [when non-custodial fathers do not comply with court
orders to pay].

The current preference for the mother in custody cases, based

on the hard to overcome presumption of her fitness, is so
pronounced that it may deny fathers equal protection. Fathers

who would like to have custody and who might make better
custodians face such an uphill battle that many are discouraged
from trying. In addition, children may suffer when the real
'best interests of the child' are ignored or undermined by this
automatic preference for the mother.'"
D.

McISAAC'S CRITIQUE OF WEITZMAN'S ANIMUS TOWARD JOINT
CUSTODY

In his penetrating critique of The Divorce Revolution, 145 Hugh
Mclsaac, Director of Family Court Services for the Los Angeles

Conciliation Court, adeptly unfolds the extent of Weitzman's animus
toward joint custody:

Weitzman reaches conclusions about joint custody without

adequate data; the last data in her sample were collected in
1977, three years before California's joint custody statute
[went into effect] *146 She ignores studies and positions conflicting with her position, failing to cite a single study supporting
the value of joint custody 47. . . Jessica Pearson's study [of
144. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL.

L. REv. 1169, 1194 (1974).

145. Mclsaac, The Divorce Revolution: A Critique, 10 CAL. FAm .L. REP. 3069,
3070 (May, 1986).
146. In addition, Weitzman frequently cites as established facts the unsubstantiated opinions of avowedly anti-joint custody attorneys such as Nancy Polikoff and
Joanne Schulman. See, e.g., DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 218-19, 240-41,
243, 246-47. For the anti-joint custody views of Schulman and Polikoff, see, e.g.,
Schulman, Second Thoughts on Joint Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its
Implicationsfor Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 539, 577 (1982)
(joint custody is, in effect, an attack on women who have been, and wish to continue
to be, the primary caretakers of their children); Polikoff, Custody and Visitation:
Their Relationship to Establishing and Enforcing Support, WOMEN'S LEGAL DEF.
FUND

4 (circa 1985) (fathers use the threat of a custody dispute to negotiate for a

lower amount of child support). Schulman also authored FINAL REPORT OF THE
SENATE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY EQUITY, see supra note 5, which, inter alia, seeks to
vitiate current California joint custody law. Id. at P-8, VII-1 to VII-30.
147. For convenient synopses of pro-joint custody studies, see National Council
for Children's Rights, SYNOPSES OF SOLE AND JOINT CUSTODY STUDms (1987). For a
balanced collection of joint custody studies, see JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PAR-
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the relationship between custody and child support payment
compliance] is misrepresented 48 ....
In fact, Pearson's study
found a statistically significant relationship between joint physical custody and [child support payment] compliance. 49 When
asked by a member of the research team about this error,
prior to publication of The Divorce Revolution, Weitzman
[responded:] 'It is too late to change.'
Another interesting omission is the failure to use a study, done
in October, November and December 1982, of 527 families
with children who obtained dissolutions in the Central District
of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. This study conflicted with Weitzman's contention that, when custody disputes
are tried, 63o0 of the awards go to fathers. 50 The 1982 study,
ENTING (J. Folberg ed. 1984).

Most child custody studies are limited by sampling and other technical deficiencies. See generally, Demo & Acock, The Impact of Divorce on Children, 50 J. OF
MARRIAOE & THE FAM. 619, 639-41 (1988). A circumspect restatement of the weight
of the currently available evidence is that joint custody will maximize parental
satisfaction and facilitate children's adjustment for many divorcing families.
It should also be noted that whereas joint custody has been obliged by policymakers to justify its place as a custodial option, sole custody has not been subjected
to this precondition even though its defects - the most notable of which is its
creation of a large number of single-parent families with all their attendant problems
have been relatively well-documented. See, e.g., Guidubaldi, Perry & Nastasi,
Growing Up in a Divorced Family: Initial and Long-Term Perspectives on Childrens'
Adjustment, in FAMILY PROCESSES AND PROBLEMS: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOoICAL ASPECTS
234 (S. Oskamp ed. 1987) (there appears to be no logical rationale for a continued
90% mother-custody rate, and yet courts persist in awarding custody to mothers
regardless of sex or age of the child or such critical support factors as financial
resources of the prospective custodial parent).
148. DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 255.
149. See generally Pearson & Thoennes, Child Custody, Child Support Arrangements and Child Support Payment Patterns, 36 Juv. AND FAM. CTS. J. 49 (1985);
see also Supporting Children, supra note 87, at 323-25, 335 (in study based on
responses of payees, best payment patterns were exhibited by payors with joint
residential and joint legal arrangements and best pattern of making voluntary
additional payments was exibited by payors with joint residential arrangements); The
Survey of Absent Parents, supra note 130, at vi, viii, 46-7, 49, 53 (joint custody is
among the best predictors of child support payment compliance); and see Process of
Negotiation, supra note 11 at 1168 n.110 (highest percent of income paid in child
support occured in case of shared physical custody).
150. In fact, Weitzman bases this conclusion on a statistically insignificant
sample of only 16 cases. See DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 233. And in
Child Custody Awards, supra note 8, at 516, she concedes; "[A] focus on fathers
may be misplaced. The gatekeepers in the process of determining custody are more
likely to be the attorneys and mothers who are deciding, in large part, to which
fathers they will 'give' custody."
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published in the Conciliation Courts Review and sent to
Weitzman at her request, showed that only one of 26 contested
cases resulted in sole custody to the father, while 17 resulted
in sole custody to the mother."'
These vignettes reveal a central reason for some of the problems with Weitzman's analysis: Does she present information
in a way most favorable to her point of view? Rather than
reviewing relevant information dispassionately, has the researcher-turned-advocate shaped the data to buttress the outcome she wishes to achieve?...
Weitzman's analysis of the divorce process, which covers only
a narrow window of time, fails to recognize that parents can
move on from the angry, bitter stage and can learn to cooperate.5 2 She recommends that joint custody be entered only
when both parents agree. Unfortunately, this approach elevates
parental custody preferences over children's needs for both
parents, and ignores the one sensible alternative: that parents
cooperate and work together .... The result [of Weitzman's
approach] is likely to be many more bitter custody disputes,
or "child abandonment" by the non-custodial parent [after he
or she loses custody]....
Weitzman's policy recommendation-a 'primary parent standard'-. . . also ignores the likelihood, in a world where 63016
of all mothers work outside the home, that the primary
caretaker 5 3 may be the babysitter or day care center....
The adoption of Weitzman's new standard, and especially
linking this standard to [post-divorce] ownership of the family
151. See Memorandum from Girma Zaid to Hugh McIsaac concerning Child
Custody Disposition Survey (April 26, 1983) (on file at Northern Illinois University

Law Review); Mediation, supra note 130, at 57-59. See also Post-Divorce Families,

supra note 130, at 6, 13 (there appears to have been no increase, and possibly a
decrease, in the rate of paternal custody in California between 1979 and 1985 which
is estimated at about 5%).
152. See The Survey of Absent Parents, supra note 130, at 35, 37 (only about
25% of pilot study sample consisting of both custiodial and non-custodial parents
report hostility towards ex-spouse); Cooperation, supra note 132 (parental cooperation
between initially uncooperative parents is most often developed and sustained in a
carefully structured joint custodial arrangement).
153. "Primary caretaker" is in fact the term preferred by Weitzman, Neely,
Chambers and other proponents to describe the custodial presumption favoring the
parent, overwhelmingly the mother, who more commonly attends to the immediate
physical needs of the child in an intact marriage. As noted by McIsaac, however, the
primary caretaker in many familes may not be a parent.
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home, would change what Robert Mnookin, professor of law
at Stanford University, has called the parties' 'bargaining
endowments.'1 5 4 Parents would be fighting over who is the

primary parent to assert their claims over both children and

property, and we would return to the terrible acrimony of the
The laws of divorce should not promote more
fault era ....

hate; rather, they should encourage and reward mutual respect.

Mclsaac goes on to criticize Weitzman for scapegoating fathers,

"trading one set of victims [mothers] for another," thus "avoiding
solutions that would address the larger problems" of the social costs
of divorce.' 5
VI.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary divorce law generates social costs because it sunders an economically efficient household unit into two inefficient and
antagonistic halves. An antidote will not be found in amendments
which tax still more the financial and spiritual resources of both
parties and harden the remnants of the post-divorce family into
implacable adversaries.15 6 It will not be found between the covers of
57
The Divorce Revolution.
154. See Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 119, at 968; Cf. DIVORCE
supra note 1, at 386 (primary parent presumption would improve
chances of mother to keep the family house).
155. But cf. Divorce Revolution, supra note 1, at 394-95. Calling for stronger
social and economic supports for custodial parents, in addition to changing the rules
for custody, Weitzman quotes approvingly an unidentified female Norwegian social
scientist: "As soon as I got divorced my income went up: both the local and national
government increased my mother's allowance, my tax rate dropped drastically as I
was now taxed at the lower rate of a single head of household, and my former
husband contributed to child support."
See also Tobin, Book Review, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1641 (1987) (reviewing L.
REVOLUTION,

WEITZMAN,

THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION

(1985)). (Weitzman proposes to redefine

"property" to permit divorce settlements which overwhelmingly favor women while
ignoring the needs and concerns of men.); Cook, Book Review, L.A. Times, Nov.
17, 1985, Book Review Section, at 2 (reviewing L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985)). (Weitzman proposes that divorce law be the transfer agent for an
unearned redistribution of wealth between men and women.)
156. See Zorn, A Seminar in Divorce-Down-and-DirtyStyle, Chicago Tribune,
Nov. 4, 1988, § 2, at 1. Citing Weitzman's standard of living statistics, the seminar's
presenters advise divorcing women:
Discard all your notions about what
[Flight in every sneaky, nasty way ....
Build up cash reserves any way you can, 'sell' precious
is fair and just ....
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Weitzman's work is characterized by skewed statistical analyses,
unfounded working assumptions, one-sided presentations of the evidence, and hostility toward husbands and fathers. Much of this has
been rebroadcast uncritically by the popular press'5 8 and has infiltrated
legislative and judicial determinations. This process has not served
the quest for truth.
The truth about The Divorce Revolution is that it is not an
objective, scientific treatise. 15 9 It is a feminist tract with a political

heirlooms to friends to keep them out of your rat-like husband's hands, go
through all his files and papers, raid the safe-deposit box, shade the truth
for the judge and cry on the witness stand, if possible. With child abuse
and spouse abuse, you don't have to prove anything, you just have to
accuse. Think about it.

157. For an example of the chilling effect THE DIVORcE REVOLUTION has had

on the formulation of cooperative public policy approaches to the economic and
social consequences of divorce, see The Survey of Absent Parents, supra note 130,
at 48:
These findings [of a positive link between child support payment and friendly
relations between the parents) suggest that public policy oriented to obtaining
higher [child support] payment levels should attempt to minimize levels of
hostiltiy and maximize friendliness between separating parents. On the other
hand, Weitzman (1985) has argued that this was the goal of the no fault
'divorce revolution,' the results of which [in Weitzman's view] have been
increased (not decreased) impoverishment of families headed by divorced
women. It is therefore not clear the extent to which public publicy should
attempt to improve the emotional climate of parental separations if [Weitzman is correct and] the net effect is that the noncustodial parent pays less
but feels better about his relations with the family.
Cf. CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY, supra note 15 at 15 (Table J) (mean payments

received by custodial mothers who entered into voluntary child support agreements
with non-custodial fathers were 6307o greater than mean payments received pursuant
to court-ordered awards, and such amounts constituted 810 of the amounts due
compared to 56% under court-ordered awards).
158. For a recent parade example of this process, see Olson, Why More Dads
Are Getting the Kids, Bus. Week, Nov. 28, 1988, at 118 (citing Weitzman: "fathers
win 680o of the time" in contested custody cases). Olson neglects to point out that
Weitzman's finding was based on a statistically insignificant subsample of only 16
cases.
159. [S]ociology [is] a discipline in which ideological requirement and psychological need have come to replace evidence as the condition for acceptance of fact and explanation ....

[T]he result is an ever-accelerating

tendency toward the embarrassingly incoherent muddle that so much sociology accepts as explanation. Worse yet, one will discover that this tendency
is greatest in those areas that are most important to the public, the group
that pays the bills for what it supposes to be the relatively objective search
for truth social science is supposed to be ....

When ideology replaces

1989:251]

"THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION" REVISITED

agenda. 160 It proposes a program designed to rivet the children of

divorce to custodial mothers who cannot support a family without
large transfer payments from ex-husbands-who, in turn, are to be

deprived of a normal parenting role. This program is unnatural and
coercive to its core 16 1 and cannot function without massive and costly
state enforcement. 6 2 The very flaws of The Divorce Revolution suggest

a better alternative.

overwhelming evidence in virtually every introductory sociology textbook

However, it
. . . sociology deserves the low esteem in which it is held ....
is far more serious that the institutions that mold public opinion ... accept

such nonsense and present it to readers as fact.

Goldberg, Poverty Doesn't Make Blacks Better Athletes, N.Y. Times, April 15, 1989,

at 14. Goldberg is chairman of the department of sociology at City College, New
York.
But cf. Myrdal, Utilitarianism and Modern Economics, in ARRow AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY OF EcoNomIc POLICY (G. Feiwel ed. 1987) cited in
WOMEN'S QUEST, supra note 23 at 7: "Disinterested research there has never been....
There can be no view except from a viewpoint."
160. For a journalist's indictment of the popular media's penchant for disseminating less than the complete picture about sensational but complicated public issues
and the exploitation of this phenomenon by special interest groups to further
legislative, administrative or policy goals, see Carter, Alar Scare: Case Study in
Media's Skewed Reality, Wall St. J., April 20, 1989, at A13 (public advocacy group
used and was used by media to make case that Alar, an agricultural chemical applied
to apples, posed an intolerable threat to preschool children even though no solid
scientic consensus against this use of Alar had been reached).
161.
The single-parent family is a travesty of human needs. The overburdened,
self-supporting working mother can hardly take the place of two parents,
let alone the tribal structure homo sapiens have always required. Children
need a whole constellation of parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, siblings,
teachers and coaches to grow well.
Jong, Pro-Life? Or Pro-Death?,N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1989, at 23.

Bad news from the Census Bureau: The number of single-parent households
is up sharply ....

More than 15 million U.S. children now live apart from

their mother or father. In 1960, only 7 percent of white children and 22
percent of black children were so labeled. In 1988, the figures were 19
percent and 54 percent, respectively....

No government program can

substitute for the economic and moral benefits of growing up in a family
with loving, authoritative role models of both sexes. Until our culture finds
a way to reverse the collapse of such families, welfare dependency will
continue to perpetuate itself.
What Other Newspapers Are Saying, Chicago Tribune, March 4, 1989, § 1, at 11
(quoting the San Antonio Express-News).
162. "Weitzman's insights and research were enormously valuable to us as we
battled for a Federal child Support enforcement law with real bite." Margaret M.
Heckler, former Secretary of Health and Human Services, as quoted on the back
cover of the first Free Press Paperback Edition of THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, 1987.

298

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 9

If divorcing parents were obliged as much as possible to share
their children's needs, emotionally as well as financially, in a joint
custody arrangement, Weitzman's economic argument would lose all
weight. In one stroke, this approach would bring the post-divorce
income/needs ratios of the parents closer to parity and salvage for
the children the advantages of an uninterrupted parental relationship
with both parents. Joint custody, of course, will not eliminate the
larger, non-marital component of the wage differential between men
and women. But this issue cannot-and should not-be addressed
within the narrow confines of divorce and custody law.
In the end, The Divorce Revolution is a very reactionary document. It has a deep stake in perpetuating the war-between-the-sexes
which a civilized divorce policy would try to defuse. The real divorce
revolution will bring cooperation, not confrontation. We have yet to
read about it.

